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NEW INDICATORS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS EFFECTS

Frank M. Tims, et al

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# REPORT

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## New Indicators of Psychological Operations Effects

by

Frank M. Tims  
Robert C. Sorensen  
Frances C. Mushal

With the Assistance of  
John T. Morgan, Jr.

PREPARED FOR THE  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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20. expected) and develops a series of concepts and approaches which may be applied to effects analysis. Central to the effort is the "indicator generator" concept, which involves building into the PSYOP message or medium certain characteristics which will provide trace measures after the operation. Opportunities for development of indicators and "indicator generators" are reviewed in the context of a hierarchical impact model or "grading model," and with regard to various audiences and media. The report also presents a case study on development of PSYOP objectives from national objectives in Vietnam, and a proposed taxonomy of PSYOP objectives.

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## PREFACE

It has been 25 years since Paul M. A. Linebarger wrote Frontiers in Psychological Warfare<sup>\*</sup>, delineating areas for further development in Psychological Warfare. Then as now the problems and needs were greater than the available resources, both human and technological. Some of the ideas advanced by Linebarger were somewhat unconventional, but that was the nature of the document.

The present study, occasioned by the lack of satisfactory indicators for PSYOP effects analysis, was undertaken in a similar spirit, realizing that some aspects of the task might be at present infeasible and that conventional approaches had changed little since World War II. The major exception to this is the use of computers for content analysis, particularly the PSYOP Automated Management Information System (PAMIS) developed by Phillip P. Katz.<sup>\*\*</sup> Because of other ongoing studies in the content analysis and interrogation areas, we have paid less attention to these approaches. We believe that the content of this report will stimulate some new thinking in the area and lead to improvement over presently available indicators.

While the content of this report is primarily the responsibility of its authors, some words of acknowledgement are in order. In particular we wish to thank Dr. J. M. Savall of the U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, who provided valuable technical support and made useful recommendations for changes in the final report. Special thanks are also due Dr. H. Roland Ludden, formerly Special Assistant to the Director for International and Civil Affairs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army; CPT Joseph Thach of the Psychological Operations Branch, ODCSOPS; and COL Raymond Deitch, formerly chief

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<sup>\*</sup> Paul M. A. Linebarger, Frontiers in Psychological Warfare, ORO-T-85, Operations Research Office (now General Research Corporation), 1 February 1950.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Phillip P. Katz, A Systematic Approach to Psychological Operations Information, American Institutes for Research, 1970.

of the Psychological Operations Branch, ODCSOPS, for valuable guidance, suggestions and assistance in the conduct of the study. LTC John T. Morgan, Jr. (USA,Ret) provided extensive information and insights from his experience as Psychological Operations Officer in Vietnam, at Headquarters, U. S. Army, Pacific and later as Chief of the Psychological Operations Branch, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Military Operations. LTC Morgan provided frequent consultations for the study team and prepared a valuable working paper for the team (part of this paper is published as Appendix A of this report).

General Research Corporation personnel who have contributed to the study include Mr. Richard P. Joyce, whose background and knowledge of the field are extensive; Mr. Joyce provided useful advice on several aspects of the report including recommendations regarding the report organization. Thanks are also due Mr. Roswell B. Wing who participated in the early conceptualization of the study and provided valuable criticism when the study team requested it. Mr. Howard C. Olson also provided numerous contributions, including many worthwhile suggestions for revisions in the final report. Recognition is also due Ms. Jane Hurst who worked patiently through long hours preparing the manuscript for the final report.

Thanks are also due the personnel of the Psychological Operations Branch, ODCSOPS; the U. S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, and the Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group for the assistance provided in the early stages of the project.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The assessment of psychological operations effects is a complex problem which has been the subject of numerous efforts since propaganda was used on an unprecedented scale as an instrument of warfare during the First World War<sup>1</sup>. For the greater part, existing effects analysis studies are less than satisfactory - this may be largely a result of the primitive state-of-the-art and the constraints governing observation and other data gathering under conditions of war, rather than any lack of skill or imagination on the part of PSYOP personnel. The need for effects analysis is recognized by PSYOP personnel at all levels, as any member of the PSYOP community who has had to justify PSYOP activities to senior commanders or others having control over assets needed for PSYOP can attest. This concern has led to sometimes elaborate interpretations of data, not necessarily related to PSYOP effects as "evidence" that PSYOP indeed does produce results.

There are numerous obstacles to measurement, or at least establishment of PSYOP effects with adequate scientific validity, especially during times of war when such information is sorely needed. Some of the most significant obstacles are:

- Problems of delineating PSYOP as a component of strategy and tactics, (i.e., what precisely is PSYOP?);
- The fact that much of what PSYOP seeks to accomplish (by definition) takes place in a territorial area which is "denied," that is, to which direct access for data gathering and observation is restricted by enemy control over the area;
- Lack of an adequate model for the study of PSYOP effects on populations in denied areas;
- The fact that PSYOP objectives are not usually well-defined, specific, or well-understood;
- The difficulty of exercising a measure of control over variables for analytic purposes, especially under war-time conditions;

- The fact that PSYOP does not take place in a vacuum; that it is but one of a host of variables influencing events in the enemy-controlled area;
- The fact that certain effects are long-term, thus increasing the likelihood that other forces will confound the observed effects;
- Problems of conceptualizing effects in such a way that observed outcomes may be logically related to specific PSYOP input and the process by which x leads to y is clearly understood.

#### SCOPE AND PURPOSES OF THE PRESENT STUDY

The basic task of this research is to identify and operationally define new indicators of the immediate effects of psychological operations. By immediate is meant the centering of attention on results or consequences directly or locally associated with psychological operations, as contrasted with the attainment of national or military strategic goals, objectives or purposes. Our principal concern in this report is with the effects of mass media PSYOP in denied areas.

Strategic goals and psychological operations programs organized toward the attainment of those goals are treated as givens in the present study, and attention is focused on local target population results as effects of PSYOP. Specific questions to which indicators will be addressed are:

1. Do particular people pay attention to particular psychological operations?
2. Do they understand them?
3. Do they react to them or otherwise behave differently because of them?
4. Who is reacting to what aspect of the PSYOP communication; where, when, and how are they reacting?
5. How do the methods of acquiring such information influence the kinds of information obtained?

## DEFINITIONS

Before proceeding to a discussion of limiting factors already briefly mentioned and to a description of the approach to the problem as developed in this study, several standard definitions must be presented. They are as follows:

### Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

Those military, political, economic and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in any group the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives. These operations also include psychological warfare (PSYWAR).<sup>2</sup>

### Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR)

The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.<sup>2</sup>

### Propaganda

Any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals in support of national objectives; communications designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes or behavior of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.<sup>2</sup>

### Strategic PSYOP

Operations designed to further broad or long-term national objectives. Guidance for such operations usually emanates from high levels of authority and is directed at forces, people or areas in their entirety.<sup>2</sup>

### Tactical PSYOP

Operations designed to exploit vulnerabilities in foreign military forces and populations in support of tactical military operations.<sup>2</sup>

### Mass Media

Mass media are organized means of reaching large numbers of diverse kinds of people quickly and efficiently. Since audience characteristics

are relative, some flexibility in this definition is necessary. For purposes of this study, mass media will be said to include print media (news-papers, magazines, and leaflets), broadcast media (radio and television), and the movies.<sup>3</sup>

#### Denied Area

A geographic area to which direct access is forcibly controlled by a hostile force or in which, for political or diplomatic reasons, direct access is infeasible.<sup>4</sup>

The above definitions in themselves present an obstacle to the determination of PSYOP effectiveness in that not all of them are agreed upon by the military and other agencies/departments of the U. S. Government. Only the Army accepts the first five. Without approved definitions, binding on all agencies and departments of the government, it has in the past been difficult to achieve agreement on what is PSYOP, let alone provide for coordination in the establishment of effectiveness measurement of its programs.

It should also be pointed out that the terms "strategic" and "tactical PSYOP" have little meaning to the military PSYOP operator or staff officer. In essence, a strategic program such as one designed to induce desertions, defections or surrenders becomes tactical PSYOP when practiced by a rifle company attempting to induce the surrender of a surrounded enemy unit. The only constant, real difference is that in strategic PSYOP time is available to develop vulnerabilities, while in tactical PSYOP existing vulnerabilities must be exploited due to the limited time available. From a practical standpoint a differentiation between the terms, in the conduct of operations, becomes an exercise in futility.<sup>5</sup>

#### LIMITATIONS

Our concern with denied areas at once places rather definite limitations on the methods which may be used to gather data. The survey and survey coupled with the experimental designs which can be so readily used in areas under friendly control are of only limited use where denied-area-PSYOP is concerned.

Despite the fact that an area is denied to us, the regime controlling it has to function, in spite of its determination not to let us observe the details of its daily activities. A certain amount of communication must take place within the society and between hostile governments allied with one another, and it is not often practical to conceal this communication. During World War II, the Allies obtained considerable intelligence through monitoring enemy radio traffic: "...frequently, the enemy assumed, and in Germany particularly, that (the transmitters) were so weak and so local and so limited in reach, that they allowed stuff to go on the air, thinking it was unhearable to us, of real intelligence value; tremendous intelligence value."<sup>6</sup>

Information intended for farmers may be of real value to military personnel trying to draw inferences regarding enemy food production. Enemy propaganda directed to its own civilians on a daily basis may yield insights regarding the state of enemy homefront morale. No area is totally denied, especially in this age of reconnaissance satellites and international economic integration. Tourists and refugees from a denied area may be a valuable source of information, as well as third country nationals, especially neutrals, and third country organizations may unintentionally provide information about the denied area simply by the kinds of activities and goods they direct to a denied area's population and regime. The denied area's population and regime have public lives as well as private, and they are constantly generating symbols and other kinds of behavior residuals. Thus, while the denied area itself presents obvious problems insofar as our obtaining information from it, the control the enemy regime has over information within the denied area is never total.

Historically, PSYOP operators have had to rely largely on indirect indicators for feedback from denied areas, and this has led to an array of techniques and indicators which, in our opinion, have been generally unsatisfactory. Similarly, observation of denied areas for evidence of PSYOP effects has been subject to the obvious limitation that the observation tends to be at a distance and, except in the most rudimentary cases, has lacked sufficient data to lead to an inference of PSYOP effect. Content analysis, both

qualitative and quantitative, of captured documents, mail, and enemy media output are also limited by shortcomings inherent in those kinds of data. Captured documents may contain little that is PSYOP-relevant. Such documents may also contain references to PSYOP which are routine, and not genuinely indicative of PSYOP effects. Captured mail may provide valuable insights into the state of morale of troops and homefront correspondents, and their opinions, as well as a wealth of other data on homefront and troop situations, but they are subject to censorship (both in the form of editing and voluntary restraint by correspondents) and may need interpretation to determine their true significance. Also, the capture of such mail in large quantities may not be frequent, and the mail captured may not provide a representative sample of opinion.

Media output from denied areas may be quite useful, and has at times been indicative of changes in policy and intention<sup>7</sup>. Such techniques as theme counts, symbol counts, quantification of space or time devoted to items, and tone ratings for subjects are well known quantitative techniques which are adequately addressed in Katz (1972)<sup>8</sup> and will not be considered here. The Foreign Media Analysis file (FMA) developed by Katz has been used for quantitative analyses of media output by Katz (1973)<sup>7</sup> and Consolidated Analysis Centers, Inc. (1973)<sup>9</sup>. Qualitative content analysis methods are in common use, and provided much of the effects analysis data in Vietnam<sup>10</sup>. The state control of the press in totalitarian regimes provides an advantage for this type of analysis precisely because the press is the voice of the regime, and media are often used to disseminate new policies and shifts in the popular frame of reference (e.g., the glorification and subsequent vilification of such leaders as Liu Shao Chi and Lin Pao by the news media in Peking). However, media output from a denied area should be analyzed cautiously. Centralized control is also a source of difficulty, in that the analyst must guess at the true significance of what is said and what is not said via the media. The use of media to float trial balloons is commonplace in democratic societies. In a controlled press, a great deal appears which may or may not be PSYOP-relevant. References to "enemy psywar" may be made in warnings because PSYOP is being effective, or perhaps because PSYOP is generally not effective, but provides a good example of "the enemy's wickedness."

## THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Blalock (1961) has pointed out that "Owing to the inherent nature of the scientific method, there is a gap between the languages of theory and research. Causal inferences belong on the theoretical level, whereas actual research can only establish covariations and temporal sequences."<sup>11</sup> This is an inherent limitation in the process of making inferences about PSYOP and its effects. While we may gain confidence from experience, and thus (eventually) greater predictive skill, it is unlikely that PSYOP effects analysis will ever take the form of "proving" causality.

The model used to interpret PSYOP output and effects data also imposes limitations on the kinds of inferences to be made. Clearly, the older "input-output" conception of PSYOP - what has been termed the "hypodermic effect" model, where a simple link was sought between PSYOP input and intended effects - would have been most satisfactory if it had been logically adequate. The principal deficiency in the "hypodermic effect" model was its treatment of the receiver as a passive participant in the communication process, responding to content but not interacting with the media - in other words, the process was viewed as one-directional, from sender to receiver. The "hypodermic effect" model has been displaced by the "functional orientation" of such researchers as Janis and Hovland (1959) whose model takes into account the network of mediating variables which influence the receiver's response to communication.<sup>12</sup> Klapper (1957) describes it thus: "The new orientation...can best be described...as a shift away from the concept of 'hypodermic effect' toward an approach which might be called 'situational'... It is a shift away from the tendency to regard communication as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, toward a view of the media as influences, working amid other influences in a total situation... In short, attempts to assess a stimulus which was presumed to work alone have given way to an assessment of the role of that stimulus in a total observed phenomenon."<sup>13</sup> He goes on to cite a set of generalizations emerging from this change in orientation:

- Mass communication ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather functions among and through a nexus of mediating factors and influences;

- These mediating factors are such that they typically render mass communication a contributory agent but not a sole cause in a process of reinforcing the existing conditions;
- On such occasions as mass communication does function in the service of change, either the mediating factors will be found to be inoperative and the effects of the media direct or the mediating factors which normally favor reinforcement will be found to be themselves impelling toward change;
- There are certain residual situations in which mass communication seems to wreak direct effects or to directly and of itself serve certain psycho-physical functions;
- The efficacy of mass communication, either as a contributory agent or as an agent of direct effect, is affected by various aspects of the media themselves or of the communication situations.

The foregoing discussion has clear implications for anyone attempting to explain observed effects as "PSYOP effects." The first implication is that given the constraints of data gathering in or concerning denied areas and a great deal of inference-making based on limited data, it is likely that the inferences which are made will be made in spite of gaps in the data and not by systematically filling those gaps. For example, an attempt to explain how persuasion directed at a group of farmers in North Vietnam could be related to stated objectives which were attained would call for a fairly intimate knowledge of village life in North Vietnam and adequate data on possible mediating variables (e.g., group membership-the family, farmer's associations, political organizations) in order to assess the part these variables play in bringing about the observed effects. A course which seems more likely is that stated in the basic research questions presented in the description of the scope and purpose of this project, which is essentially to obtain whatever data are available on communications efficiency (i.e., the extent to which the message is received and understood by the target audience). That course is to look for the intended effect in terms of changes in information level, attitude, values or behavior.

The question of how one delimits PSYOP as a component of strategy and tactics is subject to frequent debate. Barrett (1972) argues that existing definitions of psychological operations tend to suffer from overstatement, overinclusiveness, or vagueness. He includes the current definition promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>14</sup> The fact that psychological operations are usually part of an overall strategic or tactical plan complicates problems of analysis although some studies have attempted to relate certain kinds of psychological warfare to other kinds of military operations (for example, several studies of the Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University attempt to develop a measure of the value of loudspeaker, leaflet, and propaganda shell\* missions in terms of how they correlate with the "cheapness of advance", number of friendly casualties, and expenditure of artillery rounds).<sup>15, 16, 17</sup> At the tactical level, this problem is best exemplified by combining air bombardment, ground fire, loudspeakers and leaflets to accomplish a military objective. The success of the operation will of course be typically measured in terms of number of enemy casualties inflicted, number of enemy prisoners taken, and the control of the geographic objectives. A question is then raised regarding the prisoners and whether their surrender was a function of one of the firepower elements, the PSYOP or both. For some of the prisoners, it may be conjectured that the battle was the opportunity to surrender rather than the cause; for others the decision to surrender may have been made out of fear of being killed; some may have surrendered because the leaflets convinced them that it was the best course and the only viable alternative; and others still may have surrendered simply because there was no opportunity to escape. It is possible that skilled interrogation can identify some of these individuals although many of the prisoners may be in states of shock and confusion at the time of capture and genuinely unable to assess their true reason for surrender. This point is made in Kahn and Segal (1953).<sup>18</sup>

A related problem is the relative immediacy of effects. Measuring long-term effects such as bringing about changes in fundamental attitudes

\*The propaganda shell is an artillery round used to disseminate leaflets to enemy forces. Leaflets are packed inside the projectile so that they are scattered by the projectile's burst.

and values through strategic PSYOP campaigns also presents difficulties to the effects analysis effort. The fact is that so many events take place over the long-term, that from a practical standpoint it is virtually impossible to track them except through such sources as media output and intelligence reports. An example of a long-term campaign was the strategic "operation trail" which was carried out in Vietnam over a period of several years. Some strategic campaigns are relatively short in duration and might be exemplified by the psychological pressure operations campaign which was carried out during the second half of 1972 and which was seen to have several rather immediate effects.<sup>19</sup> Since details of the operation are still classified, it will not be discussed in this report.

The specific definition of objectives in PSYOP is a continuing problem. The overinclusiveness and vagueness which characterize the definition of PSYOP given above also seem to handicap the definition of psychological objectives. Considerable attention is given to this problem in the following chapter, but it should be understood at the outset that objectives are usually stated at high levels in general terms and that it is necessary as one goes down the hierarchy of command to relate actual programs to national objectives. Intended effects cannot be well-conceptualized in the absence of intended outcomes consistent with specific objectives, and it follows that unless intended effects are well-conceptualized, it is difficult to develop indicators for them.

#### APPROACH TO NEW INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT

It is a maxim of science that answers are dependent on the way questions are asked. It is the question that focuses our attention, defines the terms of our inquiry and establishes criteria for developing answers. The objectives of PSYOP vary greatly from one situation to another (e.g., low-intensity conflict involving a single country to high-intensity conflict involving several countries). Further, it is impossible to anticipate fully the kinds of operational and political considerations, location and availability of target audience, nature, size, and characteristics of the target audience, and the scope and complexity of the PSYOP programs to be used, except in very general and hypothetical ways. Since these have a direct bearing on the effects

analysis concepts, as well as the scope and mix of data gathering techniques to be used, it is impossible to develop a comprehensive set of free floating indicators which will be useful for all operations. However, it is possible to develop some measures which can serve as models for formulating indicators for specific campaigns.

In order to clarify the first requirement that campaign objectives be clearly specified, our first task is to develop a taxonomy of psychological operations objectives; this taxonomy can then be used to make objectives explicit and introduce an element of pre-determined accountability which will be useful both in performing effects analysis and in refining concepts in campaigns.

Having addressed the question of objectives, a review of the state-of-the-art of effects analysis will be presented, and the remainder of the report will address the state-of-the-art in more specific terms. This review will cover traditional indicators identified through review of available documents at the Army staff level, U. S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, and conferences with individuals knowledgeable in the PSYOP field. This review will set the stage for the development of new concepts and indicators.

#### SUMMARY

The need for effects analysis is recognized by psychological operations personnel at all levels, but the existing approaches have been generally less than satisfactory. Formidable obstacles exist to developing adequate effects analysis approaches. These obstacles include problems of definition, the interrelatedness of PSYOP with other components of strategy and tactics, the fact that much of what PSYOP seeks to bring about is intended to take place in denied areas, the lack of an adequate model for the study of PSYOP effects in denied areas, problems of control over variables for analytic purposes, the problem of contamination of effects by other variables, and problems of conceptualizing effects in ways which permit outcomes to be related logically to specific PSYOP input and process. This study seeks to develop new indicators of mass media/psychological operations effects in

denied areas at least to the extent to which it can be done given existing knowledge and theory in the behavioral sciences. Specific questions to be addressed have to do with whether particular audiences pay attention to particular psychological operations, whether they understand them and what their reaction is in terms of immediate population effects. Also to be considered is the influence of the methods of acquiring information on the kinds of information obtained.

## CHAPTER II

### PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES

#### GENERAL

It is meaningless to speak of PSYOP effects independent of PSYOP objectives, except in terms of unintended effects, and even then one must know what is intended or unintended. The PSYOP effects analyst must, after all, know with some precision what the objectives of the campaign were and the process by which those effects were supposed to have been produced. A major criticism of PSYOP has been that objectives are often not well-defined or understood,<sup>20</sup> and yet the literature dating back to World War II shows a pronounced concern with objectives.<sup>21</sup> In this chapter, attention will be given to PSYOP objectives and a framework developed for classifying objectives, such that effects analysis concepts become more feasible.

Field Manual 33-5, dated January 1974, contains a list of PSYOP objectives, both strategic and tactical.<sup>2</sup> The list is reproduced below.

1. Objectives (Strategic)
  - a. To support and explain a nation's political policies, aims, and objectives;
  - b. To relate those policies and aims to the aspirations of the target audience, where practical;
  - c. To arouse public opinion or political pressures for or against a military operation;
  - d. To influence the design of enemy strategy and tactics;
  - e. To support economic and other non-violent forms of sanctions against an enemy;
  - f. To stimulate dissension between enemy military and political elites;
  - g. To undermine confidence in enemy leadership and war aims;
  - h. To lower the morale and efficiency of enemy soldiers and civilians, seeking a reflection of lower morale and efficiency in the combat zone;

- i. To encourage disaffection in the enemy nation on the part of religious, ethnic, social, political, economic, and other elements having grievances against the government or against each other;
  - j. To interfere with control systems or with communications;
  - k. To elicit the moral or active support of neutral nations or perhaps to insure continued neutrality;
  - l. To make friendly leaders stronger and enemy leaders weaker;
  - m. To give hope and moral support to resistance elements in the enemy area;
  - n. To support a counterelite;
  - o. To gain support in newly liberated areas;
  - p. To augment or complement tactical propaganda operations.
2. Objectives (Tactical)
- a. To lower the enemy's morale and combat efficiency;
  - b. To increase the psychological impact of combat weapons;
  - c. To confuse the enemy;
  - d. To facilitate the occupation of enemy areas by delivering ultimatums and giving rally or surrender directions;
  - e. To support strategic PSYOP by furnishing more detailed and timely knowledge of local vulnerabilities which may be used in strategic plans and operations;
  - f. To give information and directions to friendly elements operating in the enemy combat zone;
  - g. To give specific and direct support to tactical commanders on short notice;
  - h. To build a favorable image of our soldiers and leaders.

Lerner (1949) identified 13 objectives ("Sykewar Missions") in his survey of psychological warfare experts who had participated in World War II operations against Germany.<sup>22</sup> Notable among these were weakening the enemy's will-to-resist, destroying the enemy's will-to-win, inducing surrenders, and shortening the war. Speier (1945) also developed six broad categories of objectives for psychological warfare.<sup>23, 24</sup> The will-to-fight or

the will-to-resist in a modern state is viewed by Speier as a complex of functions, abilities and wills, six of which psywar typically seeks to affect: 1) deciding foreign policy; 2) determination of military missions; 3) ability to govern; 4) ability to command; 5) will to obey; and 6) will to fight.

The U. S. involvement in Vietnam provides numerous examples of the problem of developing coherent and specific psychological operations objectives as well as examples of the overinclusiveness and vagueness with which PSYOP objectives are often stated. As has been the case in previous conflicts, lack of specificity of objectives was a major problem in effects analysis. Additionally, disagreement between operational and policy entities as to the psychological objectives of a campaign sometimes was evident.<sup>25, 26</sup>

It is not the purpose of this study to develop a guide to better formulation of PSYOP objectives; yet it is clear that they have received inadequate attention in the past, and this fact itself has handicapped the effort to develop new indicators. In this regard, the reader's attention is directed to Appendix A of this report, which contains a discussion of the objectives problem, together with a case study of national and psychological objectives used in Vietnam.

Having acknowledged the problem of inadequately formulated objectives, it is desirable to develop some means of categorizing and grading the large array of intended effects and the media/techniques used in pursuit of these effects. Clearly, there will be objectives which resist categorization, and objectives which are inherently multiple, as well as objectives which are not especially high in priority from the standpoint of influencing the outcome of a given conflict. To accomplish this, a taxonomy of PSYOP objectives is developed in the following section and recommended for adoption as part of the effects analysis process.

#### TAXONOMY OF PSYOP OBJECTIVES

Hovland (1954) and Weiss (1968) have each pointed out that no theoretically derived schema for categorizing mass media effects yet exists.<sup>27, 3</sup>

No such ambitious task is being attempted here. The "taxonomy" contained herein is essentially an effort to reduce the large and varied activity called "PSYOP" to several manageable categories of intended effects, and to establish a "grading" system for indicators to be used. By "grading" we refer to conceptualizing the steps in the communication process as a kind of hierarchy which will allow us to rate a given indicator in terms of the step in the hierarchy to which it corresponds. The "grading" model assumes an unbroken chain of events in the communication process. Event one might be formulation of a theme for the message. Event two might be selection of media. Event three might be actual development of a message around the theme. Event four would be the actual broadcast (or distribution) of the message. Event five is the receipt (i.e., the physical availability of the message to members of the target audience) of the message. Event six is attention of the sender. Event seven is receipt of the message through a conscious act (picking up a leaflet, tuning in a signal in order to hear, etc.). Event eight is attention to the message. Event nine is comprehension of the content of the message. Event ten is perception or interpretation of the message in receiver's frame of reference. Event eleven is credibility, or acceptance by the receiver of the message as true. Event twelve is that acceptance of the message as true creates in the receiver an awareness of the message content as a fact, rather than simply as what someone is saying; the message takes on added reality, and becomes part of the receiver's store of information. Event thirteen is the response of the receiver to the message in terms of attitude, values, and behavior. If the PSYOP objective is bringing about a given behavioral response, we may develop an indicator which allows us to make inferences regarding whether this response took place. We are also interested in knowing whether events leading up to event thirteen also took place. If event nine was prevented by, say, the message being sent in the wrong language with respect to the receiver, then event thirteen was very likely a consequence of something other than the PSYOP message. Thus, we may want indicators at several points in the chain of events. Or, we may find it impossible to construct usable indicators for event thirteen, and instead have to settle for indicators at event (or step) twelve - i.e., the awareness or information level

of the receiver with respect to the PSYOP message. In any case, it will be necessary for the PSYOP operator to be aware of the point in this chain of events which is appropriate to the indicator he is developing. Thus, each indicator is "graded" by the event or step at which it is appropriate. It will also be necessary to classify kinds of audiences and media for purposes of the taxonomy.

Such a "grading" model will be presented in essentially three components with each component broken down into smaller events. The components are: 1) input or potential communication efficiency; 2) communications efficiency; and 3) awareness/attitudinal/behavior effectiveness. There is no explicit treatment of mediating variables as such in the model, although the role of mediating variables must certainly be taken into account. However, for purposes of this crude grading model, the variables are viewed as steps in a process, i.e., a linear process.

#### Input Objectives or Potential Communications Efficiency

The input objectives are important because, to the extent that input objectives are met, potential communications efficiency is enhanced. To the extent that the input objectives are not met, potential communications efficiency declines. Simply put, this means that if the PSYOP message is well-formulated (i.e., developed and presented in a way that is culturally appropriate and appropriate to the situation), linguistically correct, credible in terms of the target audience's frame of reference and transmitted by appropriate media at an appropriate time (those media which can be received by the target audience and at a time when the target audience is likely to attend those media), the likelihood of communications efficiency is enhanced. Note that at this point we are not dealing with effectiveness.

#### Communications Efficiency

Communications efficiency is distinguished from communications effectiveness (awareness/attitude/behavior effects) in terms of the "grading" model. Those events other than input events which are essential to communications effectiveness but which are not themselves effectiveness events are termed communications efficiency events. By communications efficiency, we

refer to the degree to which PSYOP communication is able to reach the intended audience. Questions of resources involved in the process are not considered in the definition, although optimizing the cost/benefits ratio is implied by the term. Communications efficiency begins with attention by the receiver to the sender and proceeds by step to credibility. By attention to sender we mean a state of readiness of the receiver to receive a message such as having tuned one's radio to the correct frequency and by credibility, the final state in communications efficiency, i.e., the actual acceptance of the message as believable or true. Steps in the communications efficiency process are: 1) attention to the sender; 2) receipt of message; 3) attention to message (reading, hearing or viewing); 4) comprehension of content of message; 5) perception or interpretation of the actual message in one's own frame of reference; and 6) credibility - the acceptance of the message as true.

Having proceeded through communications efficiency, and, given that the chain of events has not been broken by some intervening event (such as atmospheric conditions which make it impossible to understand what is being said because of static, or the illiteracy of the person receiving a written message), the communications efficiency process is complete, and our attention turns to awareness, attitudinal, and behavioral effects.

#### Awareness/Attitude/Behavior Effects

While communications efficiency was viewed as a linear or sequential process, the awareness/attitude and behavior effects are somewhat more difficult to order. Awareness is enhanced by credibility. Once the message has been accepted as true, then the individual incorporates it into his consciousness and frame of reference. This enhanced awareness may result in attitude change or overt behavior. The two do not necessarily follow in a one-to-one relationship. The literature on attitude and behavior make it clear that attitude formation or change may be a function of behavior. On the other hand, attitude is defined as a state of psychological readiness to act in a given manner toward given objects. It is not our purpose at this point to dwell on the attitude-behavior controversy, only to acknowledge it and to incorporate the concept into the model of grading indicators.

However, it might be said at this point that PSYOP has among its objectives the development of attitudes favorable to the PSYOP operator's cause and his forces. PSYOP also aims to bring about behavior which does not necessarily involve attitudinal change such as when members of a friendly or neutral population are instructed to move away from an area in which the tactical operation is about to take place. There are also PSYOP objectives which involve concurrent changes in attitude and behavior as when enemy troops are urged to surrender or defect with the attitude change being along the lines of a more favorable image of our own troops - e.g., likely to treat captives well - and corresponding behavioral responses in the form of actually surrendering in accordance with instructions.

#### Other Outcomes

A fourth category of PSYOP effects might be called other outcomes. This deals primarily with second order effects of PSYOP such as when individuals from enemy units surrender in large numbers in response to PSYOP, thereby reducing the amount of effort required to win a given battle. Because second order effects are often not easily related to PSYOP and because even the first order effects tend to be confounded with the effects of other operations, no attempt will be made at this point to deal with this category.

#### RELATIONSHIP OF OBJECTIVES TO EFFECTS ANALYSIS

It is necessary to have a clear understanding of what PSYOP seeks to accomplish in order to focus the effects analysis process. This problem, in view of the lack of precision with which objectives are often stated, together with situational restraints on acquisition of data (e.g., access to samples, cultural factors, catastrophic events which render the context for interpretation of data uncertain, and confounding of PSYOP effects with other effects) has operated to render PSYOP effects analysis a difficult proposition. A clear understanding of objectives is essential to PSYOP effects analysis, yet many of the approaches which have been historically used seem to assume that PSYOP effects are broad categories rather than specific and that the achieved effect, if desirable, equals the intended effects. Indeed, many PSYOP campaigns have been conceived broadly, as in the surrender propaganda

of the Korean conflict period.<sup>28</sup> A review of leaflets used during that period indicates that more specific effects might be inferred. A detailed taxonomy of objectives is developed in Appendix B of this report, but for immediate purposes an attempt will be made to delineate a useful categorization for purposes of review of effects analysis approaches. It seems to us that the problem of defining PSYOP objectives must take into account the following dimensions:

- Time Dimension;
- Activities involved;
  - o Facilitative;
  - o Information or Awareness;
  - o Attitudes (or Attitudes and Values);
  - o Behavior;
- Audiences;
  - o Enemy Forces;
  - o Enemy Homefront Audiences;
  - o Friendly Populations in Enemy-Controlled (or Contested) Areas;
  - o Neutrals;
  - o Enemy Political Elites;
  - o Enemy Military Elites;
- Media;
  - o Print;
  - o Electronic.

These dimensions are considered in more detail below.

#### Time Dimension

The temporal or time dimension in which the relative immediacy of effects sought are addressed is a principal aspect. Katz (1970) has suggested that effects may be short-range, long-range or long-range-institutional.<sup>29</sup> Where short-range effects are concerned, our primary orientation should be toward disseminating information for instrumental reasons or securing an immediate behavioral response and any supporting attitudinal change which may facilitate the response. Where long-range effects are concerned our orientation is toward bringing about attitudinal change and related behavior

which will lead to a re-definition of the situation favorable to our interests. Long-range-institutional effects deal with changes in values which we are seeking to effect. Riley and Cottrell (1957) have suggested that "the degree of effectiveness of psychological warfare messages is measured by the degree of change in the values of the recipients brought about by the messages."<sup>30</sup> This point is most important. The changing of values in the target audience, while an ambitious goal, may be seen to have greater value in the long-run for influencing a favorable outcome of conflict than such transitory effects as attitude change and behavior change. On the other hand, the integrated nature of values in a culture will tend to be resistant to change and will therefore require a concerted long-term effort. Vulnerabilities offering a high promise in this regard may be found in value conflicts which exist within a given society (e.g., nationalism versus pacifism, where the latter value implies international cooperation or non-belligerency).

#### Activities Involved

The second dimension of the model consists of a set of categories which reflect the kind of activity embodied in the PSYOP. They are:

Facilitative. Martin (1971) has pointed out that 95% of the communication activity supported in the name of "international propaganda" in peace time simply consists of communication which has general entertainment or use value, and which is not intended to persuade but rather to establish a relationship of the target audience with the source via the channel.<sup>31</sup> A primary purpose of facilitative communication is to develop a channel which will be available for persuasion at a later date. When we begin to include news or information programs or content with a definite purpose in mind in terms of its implications for the audience, then the communication is classifiable under a second category, Information or Awareness.

Information or Awareness. Depending on the context of the operation, information or awareness can be the objective for a number of different kinds of operations. For example, in a cold war situation, we may attempt to provide an alternative channel or source of information for the target

audience, and our secondary objective may actually be to change the content of the regime's state-controlled news and information sources such that we are able to introduce alternative definitions of the situation or to begin the process of introducing changes in values in directions which are deemed feasible. For example, we might begin to see a trend in value change and wish to exploit that trend by accelerating it. In this case, we would attempt to reinforce the trend by introducing news and information supportive of those values. In times of armed conflict, the information would be disseminated by PSYOP for purposes of influencing the way in which our forces are perceived by the enemy or by neutral populations. In some instances we might want to minimize the fear of our troops by civilian populations or to provide an information base for decisions on the part of civilians and enemy forces, when these decisions are favorable to our operational objectives. In other instances we may not be able to persuade an enemy soldier to defect, but when he is trapped, knowledge of procedures might enable him to surrender without resistance once he sees that there is no alternative other than death. We might also wish to inform civilians of impending air strikes so that they will take measures for their own safety aside from the objective immediately at hand which might properly be described as calling for a behavioral response. The information would be useful in the long term in providing a definition of the situation which might lead to future cooperation with our forces even when PSYOP is not used. The ultimate purpose of information or awareness kinds of PSYOP is in changing attitudes, values or behavior by providing information not normally available through enemy controlled channels.

Attitudes. (where long-range-institutional effects are sought, this would read attitudes and values). This category embraces objectives which are commonly stated as "image improvement," morale (the attitudinal component), encouragement of enemy rival elites, encouragement of resistance elements and other attitudinal outcomes. Specific sub-categories of attitudes are: 1) toward us/our allies; 2) toward regime or their allies; 3) toward selves and social units.

Behavior. The payoff for PSYOP is best conceived as behavior, although one cannot dismiss the importance of attitude, since attitude has implications for behavior under given circumstances. Moreover, values which form the basis of behavior in most circumstances must also be recognized. However, the definition of the situation afforded by attitudes, values and observed events should lead to behavior desired by PSYOP planners, if the psychological operations have been well-conceived and executed and if conditions facilitating the behavioral responses are present. The major categories of behavioral response which are embodied in PSYOP objectives are: cooperation with us or our allies; non-cooperation with regime (non-participation); active resistance toward regime; attention to us in preference to regime as source of information (e.g., passing rumors); cease resistance/surrender/defection; feedback (symbolic behavior). This might take the form of seeking concessions from the regime as suggested by PSYOP, or attempts by the target audience to communicate with the regime or with third parties or even with us.

#### Audiences

Audience or subjects from whom responses are sought is a third dimension. The number of target audiences is potentially large. Within a given country there might be numerous minority groups toward whom PSYOP campaigns may be directed. However, because our concern is with target audiences at a general level, it is proposed that five or six categories will be adequate to describe most target audiences:

Enemy Forces. This group is the target of most capture/surrender PSYOP and may be further subdivided by characteristics of units, such as combat versus support, or troops at the front versus troops garrisoned far from the front.

Enemy Homefront Audiences. This is a category encompassing a multitude of diverse groups and is primarily the target of long-range or long-range-institutional PSYOP. The audiences may be specified in accordance with the objectives of the campaign and may include urban or rural populations, industrial workers, farmers, intellectuals and other class-related groups, old or young, general population or minority groups, or other audiences of a "mass" nature depending on how specific the PSYOP operator wants to be.

Friendly Populations in Enemy Occupied Areas. Again, the population may be subdivided into target audiences for specific campaigns.

Neutrals. This group constitutes an important target audience because neutrals may have extensive dealings with an enemy regime and may therefore be a potential source of influence to bring about desired changes.

Enemy Political Elites. This group may include rival parties, shadow governments, factions within ruling parties or the entire political elites of a given country. The primary aim here is to affect the making of policy and to influence critical decisions which may have significance for us.

Enemy Military Elites. Again the target audience may include factions within elites which seek to aggravate existing conflicts between political and military elites, attempt to influence policy, or to influence actual military strategic decisions.

#### Media

Media is an important consideration because it will affect the audience in different ways and will relate directly to characteristics of the audience. Two major categories of media are suggested here: print and electronic.

#### DIMENSIONS NOT CONSIDERED

##### Level of Conflict

Some have suggested that PSYOP objectives be classified by level of conflict, with identified levels being "High-intensity conflict," "Medium-intensity conflict," "Low-intensity conflict," and a fourth category, "Cold war/political conflict."<sup>5</sup> There are clearly differences in PSYOP objectives and emphases between different types of conflicts, but a detailed review of PSYOP objectives reveals that a majority of objectives are appropriate to multiple levels of conflict.<sup>5</sup> Level of conflict, therefore, does not appear especially useful in differentiating objectives.

##### Strategic Versus Tactical

This distinction does not seem to be especially useful in this schema. The same operation may be classified as strategic or tactical, depending on

the level at which it is carried out; for example, surrender appeals or morale degradation efforts may be used in support of a limited tactical effort by an infantry brigade, or in a longer term effort by a theater command. A more suitable way of distinguishing these would be in terms of: 1) immediacy of effects sought; 2) kinds of effects sought; 3) audience (nature and size); and 4) media (specificity) as discussed above.

#### Black, White, or Grey Propaganda

These terms refer to the source of a message. If the source is correctly identified, the PSYOP is white. If the source is misrepresented, it is black. If the source is not identified, and the intent is to allow the recipient to infer a source other than the actual one, it is grey. Much of the PSYOP in Vietnam, for example, was grey. It was printed by American units and dropped by American aircraft, but it appeared to have been originated by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. All three types of propaganda--black, white, and grey--have their uses, but differ primarily according to source identification. Each has its risks; white may not be believed, grey may be misconstrued, and black may be discredited.<sup>32</sup> In terms of the model briefly presented, source identification has implications for the campaign, but this is not a critical consideration for the purpose at hand, and might unnecessarily confuse what should be a relatively simple presentation.

#### APPLICATION OF THE TAXONOMY TO EFFECTS ANALYSIS

For purposes of this study, a general scheme based on the categorization already presented will be employed to identify the areas in which effects indicators are to be developed. The schema is illustrated in the following matrix.

* AUDIENCE:	TROOPS		HOMEFRONT		HOMEFRONT SUBGROUPS		NEUTRALS	
TERM:	Short	Long	Long	Long-Inst.	Long	Long-Inst.	Long	Long-I
** MEDIA:	P	E	P	E	P	E	P	E

#### 1. Potential

Communications-----Same for all categories: technical criteria-----  
Efficiency

#### 2. Actual

Communications-----Same for all categories: Level of information comprehension  
Efficiency and credence-----

#### 3. Activities-----Specify whether output is primarily facilitative, informational, or overtly persuasive

4. Effects	Specify	Specify attitudes, behavior, information level,
Intended	attitudes:	values as focus
	behavior:	
	information	
	level, etc.	

\*These are only illustrative. Another category of audience might be enemy political elites, and the intended effect, discrediting a given faction of that elite. The possibilities are numerous..

\*\* P= print; E= electronic.

By using this kind of matrix, PSYOP personnel would be able to ask themselves specific questions about their objectives, and begin to formulate appropriate concepts for effects analysis.

#### SUMMARY

A major obstacle to effects analysis has been the lack of clearly formulated and specific objectives. There has been a general tendency to use objectives with a high level of generality and inclusiveness. PSYOP objectives have been the subject of considerable speculation, puzzlement, and criticism. A need exists for some scheme to categorize intended PSYOP effects, or at least to aid in making PSYOP objectives specific enough to know what to look for in effects analysis. A "Taxonomy of PSYOP Objectives" is presented, which is intended to help the PSYOP operator think through his objectives and to state explicitly what he is trying to accomplish, and at what level the effects should be manifested.

## CHAPTER III

### PSYOP EFFECTS ANALYSIS: STATE-OF-THE-ART

#### GENERAL

The problem of addressing the state-of-the-art of PSYOP effects analysis is complicated by deficiencies in the available models of persuasive communication, the denied area problem, the inherent complexity of military operations of which PSYOP is a part, and by the problem of what we do not know about mass media effects generally. Bauer (1964) has pointed out that it is doubtful that mass media experiences alone are sufficient to cause a wide range of effects.<sup>33</sup> Predispositional factors in the audience are important in accounting for attention to and responses to media appeals. Hovland, Lumsdaine, and Sheffield (1949) observed that one of the more common effects of media presentation is to increase a person's knowledge with regard to some matter.<sup>34</sup> This effect was observed even when the intended effect, increased motivation, did not occur and only a slightly favorable shift in attitude was observed. While persuasion is an important element of PSYOP, persuasion can take many forms. FM-33-5, in delineating the role by PSYOP, describes some of the ways in which it can be employed not only to persuade but also to disrupt.<sup>2</sup> It may be readily seen that PSYOP has potential for influencing events without necessarily "persuading." An example might be seen in the dissemination of information which, when widespread, may interfere with the control mechanisms of the enemy regime. Thus when we speak of PSYOP effects it is apparent that we are talking about a broad array of events and not simply attitudes, opinions and behavior.

The major premise which led to this project has been the lack of any adequate indicators which could be used in effects analysis. Compounding the problem has been a lack of specificity and at times even agreement in defining PSYOP objectives at least in terms of strategic PSYOP. Given the overinclusive responsibilities for such tasks as morale-building, image-enhancing, surrender-inducing, subverting, cooperation-gaining and "winning

of hearts and minds," it is difficult to focus the effects analysis effort in productive ways. This has led to a preoccupation with measures of output, subjective accounts of presumed "PSYOP victory," and attempts to transform the occasional bits of data which come our way in the form of captured documents or references to "psywar" in enemy news media into indicators of PSYOP effects.

During the American involvement in Vietnam, attempts were made to utilize various battle statistics and statistics related to the pacification effort as PSYOP effects indicators.<sup>35</sup> At the division level, similar efforts to develop quantitative measures were attempted, but, like most such measures, problems of interpretation tended to get in the way.<sup>37</sup> A review of the literature tends to confirm the general observation that many of those who have written about psychological warfare or psychological operations have tended to pronounce it successful either on the basis of some external indication or a general enthusiasm on the part of the authors or their informants.

The purpose of this chapter is to review the approaches which have been used in past efforts at PSYOP effects analysis and to assess their conceptual adequacy as well as their methodological appropriateness. Such a review will serve two basic purposes. First, it will point up the usefulness as well as the deficiencies of presently employed indicators and related data gathering techniques. Second, it will provide a framework for identifying needs for additional PSYOP effects indicators and data requirements.

#### OUTPUT MEASURES AS INDICATORS

Vietnam was the first war in which U. S. forces utilized extensive automated reporting systems. One such system was PSYOPSIS, which required quantified input reflecting PSYOP activity down to division level. This activity indicator is not, of course, an effects indicator, although some have used number of leaflets dropped in a given period, or number of radio broadcast hours as an answer to the effects question in the past.<sup>38</sup> Interviews of personnel who served with PSYOP units in Vietnam, and a review

of available documents at ODCSOPS-DA indicate that output measures were also used as effectiveness indicators there.

#### OVERVIEW OF PSYOP EFFECTS INDICATORS

Many so-called indicators of "effects" are in fact only indicators of communication efficiency. Katz (1970) presents six "indicators of PSYOP effectiveness"; immediate recall, delayed recall, repetition, "paper and pencil" behavior (i.e., through attitude surveys), physical response to a message, and content analysis.<sup>29</sup> The first three clearly are indicators only of communications efficiency, in that they only establish that a given message was heard or read and understood (and, of course, remembered). They tell nothing about influence of the PSYOP on attitude, values, or behavior. "Paper and pencil" behavior, through survey responses, is of limited value when dealing with denied areas. It is true that surveys of prisoners-of-war, refugees, and populations in areas under consolidation have in the past been used, with apparently valid results,<sup>45, 46</sup> but Katz has specific reference here to accessible populations and is concerned with "before and after" measurements to assess attitude change as a function of PSYOP.

Physical response to a message refers to the taking of some positive action called for in the PSYOP (such as defecting). Obviously, when such behavior takes place, the effectiveness of the PSYOP effort is apparent. On the other hand, it is necessary to demonstrate that such action was not motivated by some other factor. Content analysis here refers to qualitative content analysis, although Katz later developed a system for quantitative content analysis (Foreign Media Analysis Subsystem, or FMA)\*. Indicators of PSYOPS effectiveness can be derived by means of content analysis of source material available from radio broadcasts, newspapers and other publications, captured documents, enemy propaganda, electronic intercepts, and in-depth interviews and agent reports.<sup>47</sup>

A report by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in Vietnam (1966) presented three categories of indicators: 1) the content of

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\* FMA is a subsystem of the PSYOP Automated Management Information System (PAMIS).

captured documents; 2) participant observer commentaries (e.g., by USIA officials); and 3) testimonials by ralliers (defectors from the Viet Cong) as to the influence of PSYOP on their decision to rally to the Government of Vietnam.<sup>48</sup> The qualitative and anecdotal accounts presented in the report are of limited value. The exploitation of captured documents is an accepted source of intelligence for PSYOP, but, in the absence of systematic data on the originating units and the campaigns to which they have been exposed, such trace measures tell little about the magnitude of effects, except in isolated instances. Participant observer commentaries in the JUSPAO report tend to be self-serving and hardly unbiased estimates. Rallier testimonials are interesting, but predictable in a program which by 1972 had induced more than 200,000\* Viet Cong to defect. Again, one may suspect bias in the solicited testimonials of interned persons who seek to demonstrate their sincerity, and who may perceive that PSYOP is a key part of the program in which they have elected to participate.

#### INTERROGATION AND INTERVIEW APPROACHES

Data from interrogations have been regarded as a promising source of PSYOP effects indicators, and have been used for that purpose since the First World War.<sup>1, 22</sup> Bruntz writes of numerous accounts of German soldiers telling their captors of the astounding influence Allied propaganda had on enemy morale, and of the extraordinary moves by German authorities to counter it. This rich interrogation data no doubt was a function of: 1) the essentially one-sided propaganda battle brilliantly waged by the Allies; and 2) the impending collapse of the German Empire, with all the attendant hardships which had accumulated during the war years, together with the fast-eroding legitimacy of the kaiser and the Junker aristocracy.<sup>1</sup> Those extraordinary interrogation data, in short, resulted from extraordinary circumstances. Lerner's account of the interrogation of German prisoners-of-war by psychological warfare intelligence (PWI) personnel makes it clear that the interrogations were handicapped by lack of an adequate conceptual framework for one of the key concerns of PWI - the influence of psychological warfare on military morale. Due to a lack of unifying concepts (and of adequate numbers

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\* Estimate by CDCSOPS, DA.

of PWI personnel), that portion of the effects analysis effort which focused on interrogation or prisoner interview data found that data unsystematic and fragmentary.<sup>22</sup>

As late as 1972, that was also the case with interrogation data from U. S. sources in Vietnam. An examination of intelligence interrogation reports (IRs) on file at ODCSOPS, DA reveals that: 1) PSYOP questions were not always asked; and 2) that responses were often not systematically pursued to obtain data beyond the communications efficiency level. (The well-known problem of getting PSYOP Essential Elements of Information (EEI) included in interrogations conducted by military intelligence personnel has been adequately treated by Katz (1970)<sup>29</sup> and the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (1969),<sup>44</sup> and will not be addressed here). Havron (1973)<sup>49</sup> performed a content analysis of a sample of IRs from Vietnam during the time frame 1968-71, and of RAND Corporation interviews conducted with Hoi Chanh (ralliers under the GVN's Chieu Hoi, or amnesty program) and North Vietnamese Army prisoners-of-war conducted in 1968-69.<sup>50</sup> His analysis was handicapped by inconsistency in IR formats, and thus, by inconsistent and fragmentary data.

An interesting aspect of the Havron analysis concerns a relatively small number of IR formats dealing with ratings of morale by prisoners and ralliers. The overwhelming majority of respondents rated unit morale as "low." This directly contradicts observations by Kellen (1970)<sup>50</sup> and suggests that the IRs, both in Vietnamese and English translation, be critically examined to see what was meant by "morale," as the term was used in interrogations. Further, there is the commonplace that the interrogations may be subject to language difficulties and bias due to the subject's desire to be cooperative.

The lack of a systematic format for PSYOP interrogation led to the development of several such formats by Pacific Technical Analysts, Inc. (PTAI, 1968) which deals with audience analysis data, PSYOP exposure (i.e., communications efficiency data), and some items on attitudes and values.<sup>51</sup> For reasons which are unknown to these writers, little of the content of the PTAI formats appear in later IRs.

Kahn and Segal (1953) carried out a series of studies in Korea during the first two years of the Korean conflict as part of a larger support activity provided by the Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, to the Far East Command. The objectives of their work were "to determine the effect of surrender/mission psychological warfare and of other factors on surrender behavior, and to determine the major differences among Chinese and North Korean prisoners-of-war and attitudes and experiences of significance to psywar operations."<sup>18</sup> This study was conducted by means of a survey among the prisoners-of-war in Korea. A total of 2,193 POWs were interviewed and the data obtained studied by means of statistical analyses. Since the primary hypothesis of the study was that surrender mission psychological warfare can precipitate surrender only in conjunction with those attitudes, situations and experiences that predispose the enemy to such behavior, scales were developed for measurement of the following variables: 1) attitudes towards civilian and military leadership; 2) reactions to physical factors such as food, cold, etc.; 3) group cohesiveness, i.e., the degree of identification with military units; 4) reactions to the military situation; 5) attitude toward the act of surrender; 6) impact of surrender mission psywar; 7) attitudes toward communist ideologies; and 8) a scale measuring degree of resistance to distinguish between prisoners who voluntarily surrendered and those who were captured under different circumstances. In some respects, this study drew upon surveys of German prisoners by World War II psywar personnel.<sup>52</sup> Kahn and Segal reported their basic hypothesis as substantiated, that is, that surrender behavior is a consequence of a number of situational, attitudinal and experiential factors among which psywar plays an important part. They recommended that the techniques utilized in their study should be adapted and integrated for use in a rapid and periodic assessment of factors affecting surrender behavior in order to provide feedback on changes in the target audience and better targeting of surrender appeals to these groups.

Andrews and Smith (1952) conducted analyses of 801 interviews of North Korean and Chinese POWs to test the hypothesis that psychological warfare has a "nudging effect" on behavior somewhat secondary to the preparatory effects of the more material aspects of warfare.<sup>53</sup> Criterion measures of

psychological warfare effects were designated as: 1) disaffection; and 2) willingness to surrender. Using a total of 14 variables, correlational analyses yielded the following observations:

- The "nudging effect" hypothesis was confirmed: Psywar has as its main and most reliable result a "nudging" effect on behavior that is chronologically secondary to the preparatory effects of attitude, morale, and experience;
- Psychological warfare is more likely to produce disaffection behavior when received close to the active combat situation. The proximity factor was not related to willingness to surrender;
- Morale and experience are definite determinants of disaffection behavior and willingness to surrender;
- The amount of psychological warfare received by the audience appears to be a definite causal factor in producing disaffection behavior and willingness to surrender;
- Psychological warfare acting even without the "favorable" influences of lower morale and lesser battle experience tends to influence disaffection behavior. Psywar tended to increase willingness to surrender only when the experience factors were also present;
- Defection and surrender are most prevalent where conditions of low morale exist prior to receipt of psychological warfare messages.

The Andrews and Smith study is persuasive in its argument, although it is based solely on interviews of POWs interviewed in the Fall of 1951. An obvious limitation of POW interviews is that POWs cannot be said to be representative of the larger universe, i.e., the armies from which they were captured. We have no way of knowing how they differ systematically from those not captured. It is noteworthy that no apparent effect of psychological warfare seemed to be due to any of the three personality trait scales used (i.e., dominance, emotional stability, and tendency to think of oneself objectively).

## PRETESTS

Pretests have been used in PSYOP since the Second World War.<sup>39</sup> The basic purpose of pretests is to obtain feedback from a knowledgeable audience regarding a particular PSYOP message and medium. The central question is one of establishing potential communications efficiency. That is, the message and medium are examined to assess the technical adequacy (linguistic and cultural appropriateness) and the likelihood that it will be noticed, read or listened to, understood, and believed by members of the intended target audience. Two kinds of knowledgeable audiences are commonly used: 1) a "most-like" panel, usually consisting of prisoners-of-war, defectors, refugees, or other persons drawn from locally available populations having cultural and demographic similarity to the target audience; and 2) panels of "expert" judges (e.g., Americans who have lived in China, anthropologists familiar with the language and ethnography of the area, etc.). A number of rating and ranking approaches have been prescribed,<sup>2, 40, 41</sup> as well as a group discussion method.<sup>42</sup> Pretests are used in conjunction with audience (or target) analysis and informed judgments regarding the feasibility of different media. Taken together, these elements provide establishment of potential communications efficiency.

The need for pretests has been established by practice. Herz (1948) cites cases of leaflets judged credible by U. S. psychological warfare personnel and identified as ludicrous by German prisoners-of-war.<sup>39</sup> During the Korean conflict, similar detection of non-credible leaflets by prisoner panels (and experts) was reported.<sup>43</sup> A report on PSYOP in Vietnam states: "The (PSYOP) evaluation process included an analysis of source, content, audience, and media used for dissemination. The evaluation was directed more toward the credibility of material than its effect on target audiences."<sup>44</sup> Pretests were especially important in Vietnam due to the linguistic and ethnic diversity of Vietnam.

The usefulness of pretests is primarily limited by the availability of audiences of "most-like" persons, or experts with accurate and reasonably current knowledge of the target audience. Some may rightfully argue that "most-like" panels, even those large enough to resemble a "representative

cross-section" of the target audience are, by definition, unrepresentative. Prisoners-of-war are not subject to the stresses and fatigue of battle, and may have forgotten significant problems related to military life. Selection factors may have been operative in their surrender or capture, thereby differentiating them in some way from those not captured. These are essentially caveats, and simply underscore the need for care in interpreting pretest results. A greater problem lies in obtaining pretest panels for strategic PSYOP, since the target audience may be one which experiences little out-migration, and is located within a relatively large and distant denied area (e.g., ethnic Koreans living in Manchuria, rural Chinese in Sinkiang Province, the people of Yakutsk) and about which limited recent data are available.

#### "VALUE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE" STUDIES

A part of Project POWOW<sup>54</sup> was a series of correlational analyses of psychological warfare output, tactical air support, and a "cheapness of advance" measure ("cheapness of advance" was defined in terms of a ratio: number of miles advanced vs. casualties). For loudspeaker missions, the results were inconclusive. Correlation coefficients were statistically significant for one of the three months studied, and non-significant overall. For that one month, each extra loudspeaker mission was associated with a saving of 200 U. S. casualties. However, extra loudspeaker missions for the following two months were associated with increased U. S. casualties. The authors concluded that loudspeaker effects, in terms of cheapness of advance, are variable in the presence of unspecified conditions.<sup>17</sup>

In a similar analysis of the military value of the propaganda shell two conclusions were reached: 1) artillery-disseminated propaganda was one of the major factors determining "cheapness of advance"; and 2) only a very small expenditure of propaganda shells was needed to produce important results.<sup>16</sup>

A similar study of the military value of propaganda leaflets disseminated by aircraft concluded that no demonstrable effect on "cheapness of advance" could be shown. It was suggested that other factors may have also affected "cheapness of advance."<sup>15</sup>

Responsive physical action was cited by Lerner (1949) as the most satisfactory evidence of psychological warfare impact when it is available in sufficiently large quantities, and interpreted by trained analysts so that the logical error of "affirming the consequent" (the unjustified post hoc ergo propter hoc assumption that events are caused by a given stimulus simply because they immediately follow that stimulus) is avoided.<sup>22</sup> Lerner provides examples of responsive actions which are so consistently correlated with psywar operations as to justify inferences of probable psywar effects. One such example is the widespread display of white flags in Frankfurt in apparent response to Radio Lux and other psywar appeals. On the other hand, recent experience in Vietnam provides examples of both satisfactory and less-than-satisfactory use of responsive action as an indicator.

An indicator which is not easily quantifiable concerns responsive actions, often gleaned from captured enemy documents, to prevent defections of Viet Cong (rallying to the GVN in Vietnam) or desertions by officers or cadre members. Enemy counteractions detected through captured documents, interrogations, direct observations and other intelligence sources include restrictions placed by the enemy on the freedom of movement of his own personnel, and enemy use of broadcasts and leaflets to counter allied PSYOP.<sup>55, 56</sup> A major problem in interpreting the significance of these kinds of responsive action indicators is that their significance may not be clear since PSYOP is but one of a large number of factors which likely influenced the enemy's behavior.

MACV staff studies regularly cited such indicators as mass surrenders in response to PSYOP-firepower combinations, instances of local cooperation of civilians in supplying intelligence data on Viet Cong (VC) whereabouts and supply caches, number of ralliers per area per period, and reduced frequency of enemy fire directed toward medical evacuation helicopters.<sup>55</sup> Morris (1969), in his work on Vietnam, identified indicators primarily of the responsive action type used at division level: 1) number of Ho Chi Minh per month in the division area of operations; and 2) subsidiary indicators

such as mass rally rate, number of ralliers volunteering to serve as Kit Carson Scouts with the division, and number of ralliers rallying to U. S. units rather than to Government of Vietnam (GVN) officials.<sup>37</sup> These indicators are all treated in a statistical manner. While Morris' data might be interpreted as effects of PSYOP supporting the Chieu Hoi program, it is difficult to ascribe such responsive action to any PSYOP program the division may have had in operation, since the effects observed could have resulted as well from GVN national programs or from PSYOP in other division areas or even from PSYOP by non-American units.

Another category of responsive action often used as an indicator of effects is the extent to which people in a target audience follow instructions contained in PSYOP messages. Specific reference here is to tactical PSYOP designed to keep friendly or neutral civilians out of a battle area. The indicator is monitored by direct observation. In the case cited by Morris, the observation was performed from a helicopter by a PSYOP crew.<sup>37</sup> The extent to which intelligence is volunteered by informants is similar. The rationale for attributing such behavior to PSYOP is that PSYOP media are used to disseminate information about the monetary or other material rewards for information.

Other quantification of indicators was tried in Vietnam, some of which are noted below.<sup>36</sup>

#### The Number of Persons Defecting

The Chieu Hoi program, for example, was highly dependent upon information advanced through propaganda media. A major problem with this indicator was that it was subject to large fluctuations over time as a function of combat operations, hardships and other factors.

#### The Number of Weapons Brought in per Defector

The assumption here was that carrying a weapon to the Chieu Hoi Center would not be a normal act were it not for the information advanced through PSYOP means concerning the reward value of the weapons. However errors of unknown magnitude may have been introduced by ralliers turning in arms caches for rewards, thus badly distorting the ratio.

### Population Security

This indicator was simply the percentage of the population considered secure in a given area of South Vietnam. Percentages were based on estimates by GVN officials or the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). This figure, however, depended on many things, including the accuracy of the estimate itself.

### Number of Enemy Terror Incidents

The assumption in this case was that VC incidents would be few in number in areas where the VC was either very weak or very strong. So many variables appear to enter here that valid use of this as a PSYOP effects indicator is most debatable.

### Surrender Rates

The assumption here is the obvious one, i.e., that enemy surrender rates vary with enemy morale, and that PSYOP has as an objective the degradation of enemy morale. It must be observed, however, that morale is certainly not a function of PSYOP alone, and that surrender rates are demonstrably subject to influences other than PSYOP.

These efforts were intended to "objectify" the available "indicators" of PSYOP effects on a national level and on the Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) level, and use them to monitor PSYOP impact on both friendly and enemy populations. The "indicators" were plotted on a monthly basis to yield data on trends, but as indicators they suffered from serious shortcomings. First, their intrinsic value is most questionable. Too many uncontrolled variables have obvious serious impact on the phenomena behind the indices. Second, the data tend to be too gross for any detailed analysis of their relationship to political and military situation variables, making interpretation especially difficult.

A major problem with statistical indicators such as those cited here are: 1) the number of factors operating in a situation may be so numerous and the effects of PSYOP so long-termed that it is difficult to link the PSYOP with the indicator; 2) the concepts underlying some of the indicators

are based on strained reasoning, and the case for the concept as a PSYOP-relevant one is not convincing; and 3) even if the concepts were all valid, the indicators selected may be less appropriate than other available indicators.

What is evident is that the only reasonable inferences which can be drawn from the foregoing review are that most available indicators which may be said to be reasonably valid deal with PSYOP conducted in and around tactical areas of operation rather than the homefront population and subgroups within this population and that with few exceptions the indicators address PSYOP effects at the level of communications efficiency which is the second level of our model. What is clearly needed are indicators which deal with communications efficiency among the homefront population, as well as attitudes, values and behavior related to PSYOP in this population, and additional indicators dealing with these levels of effect for use in conjunction with tactical operations.

#### POST-TESTS

Although information which might give us indications of the success or failure of a particular PSYOP campaign are available from a number of sources, the information does not always include the reasons why a campaign succeeded or failed. Post-testing is intended to supplement these data. Post-testing procedures are essentially the same as pretesting procedures. Interestingly enough, the aim is only in post-testing to determine why a campaign achieved a specific result, or, more specifically, why a target audience responded in a given way. FM 33-5 recommends that the same individuals used in pretests not to be used for post-tests.<sup>2</sup>

#### SUMMARY

While numerous approaches have been used in attempts to assess PSYOP effects, they have for the most part been unsatisfactory. Campaigns dating from World War II to the Vietnam War have relied principally upon two kinds of measures: 1) output figures reflecting number of leaflets dropped, number of missions, or number of broadcast hours; and 2) pretests which are concerned primarily with assessing the technical adequacy and cultural

and linguistic correctness of PSYOP messages, and understandability and credibility of the PSYOP. Attempts were made to establish a "military value" of three types of PSYOP--leaflets dropped from aircraft, the propaganda shell, and loudspeaker broadcasts--in terms of the "cheapness of advance" by specified military units. The findings were not encouraging except in a case of the propaganda shell. Interrogation and interview approaches are of limited use owing partially to the non-systematic approach which has been used in interrogation for PSYOP intelligence and the problems of generalizing from a POW population to the enemy force as a whole. The development of a PAMIS system has made possible systematic, quantitative content analysis of media output from denied areas. However, the problems of establishing the PSYOP-relevance of enemy media content and relating it to PSYOP as a stimulus remains. The PEAS (PSYOP Effects and Analysis System), which is a subsystem of PAMIS, provides a basis for systematizing interrogation data. In Vietnam, attempts were made to develop PSYOP indicators from the various kinds of data in the automated information systems as well as from available statistics at the division level. The results were generally unsatisfactory owing largely to the fact that clear-cut relationships between PSYOP output and the alleged indicators of PSYOP effects could not be established. Otherwise, the attempts which have been made to develop "indication of PSYOP effects" or effectiveness have relied on fragmentary, subjective, and often worthless data insofar as effects analysis is concerned.

## CHAPTER IV

### BASIC REQUIREMENTS AND METHODS FOR NEW INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT

#### INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the more specific identification of requirements, assumptions and principal methods for a new indicator development. Indicator development is an open-ended task, structured primarily by the considerations of media, audience and time.

We will be concerned first with the relative distance of audiences, the kinds of media used to reach the audience and the time phasing of the objectives (whether they are short-term objectives, long-term objectives or long-term-institutional objectives).

Short-term objectives will tend to be those which are commonly subsumed under tactical PSYOP and will include specific surrender mission PSYOP, PSYOP directed towards civilians in the battle area, and deception operations. Long-term PSYOP will tend to encompass most strategic operations including surrender and defection operations not related to immediate tactical objectives, and PSYOP directed at homefront audiences exploiting grievances and existing issues in the homeland. Long-term-institutional PSYOP will have as its focus value change and will tend to relate to general kinds of appeals such as the desirability of negotiation to armed conflict, the importance of an early settlement of the conflict to the future of the country and basic kinds of appeals which seek to change fundamental orientations of the target audience toward the war aims of the regime. Media will be directed by a number of considerations including the feasibility of each medium for reaching the audience, the relative "speed" of the media (fast or slow) and the appropriateness of the media to the particular objectives at hand. For example, leaflets are probably essential to surrender mission PSYOP because they provide a tangible guarantee of humane treatment presumably with accountability for this treatment at some level; one cannot use a radio message as a safe conduct pass.

When the project was undertaken, some concern was voiced by personnel at the Army Research Institute as well as at the PSYOP Branch, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, as to whether the objectives of the research were feasible given the state-of-the-art. Rosenthal (1967)<sup>57</sup> and Murphy (1967)<sup>58</sup> have both voiced similar reservations. We have undertaken the work in the belief that at the very minimum some preliminary indicators can be developed along with data gathering techniques which will represent at least partial accomplishment of the project goals.

In this chapter we will set forth our major assumptions and outline some of the methodologies to acquire data for the candidate indicators. The point should be stressed that, as previously stated, there is no comprehensive set of free floating indicators which can be developed, and the burden of developing indicators specific to the situation will fall on the shoulders of the PSYOP effects analysis personnel. The indicator development process presented in this report should serve as a model and a kind of catalog of concepts and techniques which can be freely borrowed and adapted.

#### REQUIREMENTS

The purpose and scope of the project was stated in Chapter I together with the kinds of indicators needed. At this point, the objectives will be restated as a more elaborate set of research questions which can guide the development of concepts and indicators for effects analysis.

##### Communications Efficiency

Reception of the Message. Reception of the message can, of course, be inferred by adequate evidence of attention to the message. However, our model allows for reception without attention, and therefore it may be useful to address this point. Where electronic media are concerned, jamming should be adequate evidence of reception. The pattern of jamming should provide additional confirmation. This is not a new indicator and therefore will not be discussed at length.

Where printed media are concerned, it is difficult to develop indicators of receipt without attention which do not require actual physical inspection of the area in which they are to be distributed. Where attention is indicated, we have come to the next step in our model and are no longer concerned solely with reception.

Attention to the Message. Here we are dealing with the question presented in Chapter I: Do particular people pay attention to particular psychological operations? In this case our concern is with:

- Attention. Who is paying attention to what aspect of psychological operations? More specifically, are some groups paying attention to some types of media but not to others, or are some groups paying attention to certain kinds of content but not to others? In other words, who is actually being reached at this level, and by what media and types of content are they being reached?
- Comprehension. Of the groups which are being reached by particular kinds of media and content, do they understand the content as we wish them to understand it, or does it have some different meaning for them?
- Credence. Though not specified as part of the original task, it is essential in establishing the chain of communication efficiency to determine whether or not the content of particular PSYOP is believed. To a great extent this question can be answered in pretest; however, there are limitations to pretest which render this observation uncertain. First, there is the problem of non-availability of "most-like" panel members for certain target audiences. Second, the fact that those "most-like" audiences which may be available are not subject to the same influences which might make otherwise credible messages currently less than credible (e.g., control of use media in the target area). Therefore, this consideration of whether or not a message is believed becomes an important component of establishing a communications efficiency estimate.

### Response

At this point, we are beyond communications efficiency consideration and are dealing with effects. The chief questions here are: 1) who is responding to what aspect of PSYOP; 2) how are they responding; 3) when and where does the response take place? The when refers to whether the effects are immediate or delayed. The where, of course, refers to the location in which the effects are observed or reported, and which may not be the same location in which the PSYOP is attended.

### Other Considerations

In developing indicators and data collection methods, it is important that we take into account how the method affects the kinds of data obtained. This refers not only to the limitations inherent in the data gathering method (e.g., selectivity), but also to the question of reactivity on the part of the target audience or elites controlling the behavior of the target audience. It is important that our data gathering methods be critically examined to determine whether they introduce artifacts and thus lead to erroneous conclusions.

### WHAT IS AN INDICATOR?

Almost everyone who has done research of any kind would probably regard the above question as somewhat primitive. We all know what indicators are because we have all used them at some time or other. The literature on PSYOP effects analysis makes numerous references to indicators, although the usage is sometimes erroneous. Why, then, is it necessary that the definition be discussed here? The reason is simply to make the point that "indicators" should be related to underlying concepts, and this is frequently not the case.

An example is the study of PSYOP output and impact (MACV, 1967)<sup>35</sup> conducted in Vietnam. Indicators were developed by such frequency counts as were available through existing automated reporting systems: Hoi Chanh per month; Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces recruiting statistics; frequency of reported contacts between Army of Vietnam (ARVN) units and enemy units;

a terror index and even a numerical index called the weapons/rallier ratio (number of weapons brought in by defecting VC divided by the number of such defectors). These statistics may have had good uses, except that treating them as PSYOP effects indicators requires a good deal of imagination and rationalization, as well as selective perception. The ARVN-VC/NVA contacts reported were thought to reflect the state of ARVN morale. An objective of U. S. PSYOP in Vietnam was to raise the morale of ARVN forces. A unit with high morale is presumed to be more aggressive in seeking out the enemy. Therefore, frequent ARVN involvement in battle was construed to mean aggressive ARVN units, reflecting high morale, reflecting PSYOP success.

Such macro-data are hard enough to interpret without adding imputed meanings which are not defensible. What about frequent contacts during an NVA/VC offensive? What about high morale due to effective leadership in the absence of PSYOP? And what about variance in types of enemy contacts, such as ambushes by enemy, tanks firing on suspected enemy positions, and attacks with and without air support, not to mention possible artifacts in the reporting system?

Indicators are valid only to the extent that they relate to underlying concepts, which are themselves abstract. And, of course, concepts are valid only to the extent that they reflect the underlying phenomenon. Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg (1955) state, "The choice of appropriate indicators is very much a matter of ingenuity, to be exercised anew in every empirical study."<sup>59</sup> With regard to psychological operations effects, this means that while similarities may exist from one armed or political conflict to another, each conflict is likely to be different in significant ways -- e.g., objectives, size, complexity, and cultures, target audiences, kinds of PSYOP conducted, and nature of U. S. involvement. Thus, while generalizations may be made regarding PSYOP effects indicators, there are not likely to be valid, readily usable sets of free floating, all-purpose indicators because different conceptualizations may call for different indicators. In other words, indicators must be tailored to each specific conflict situation.

By "indicator" then, we refer to one specific observation. The observation may be qualitative or it may be assigned a numerical value in accordance with some method such as scaling. When several observations are made regarding the same phenomenon or related phenomena, and the values combined to yield a single measurement we speak of this combined measurement as an "index."<sup>59</sup>

#### IS IT POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP INDICATORS FOR PSYOP EFFECTS?

The objective of this study sounds ambitious enough if taken at face value. Some have said that the state of the behavioral sciences have not yet advanced to the point where such assessment is possible (Rosenthal, 1967).<sup>57</sup> Murphy (1967) states that "Many authorities deny the possibility of devising such definitive techniques in the belief that no one-to-one relationship between stimulus (PSYOP) and response (target group action) can be ascertained and, therefore, causality cannot be proved. A summary of some of the complexities of the problem substantiates this conclusion."<sup>58</sup> Dodson (1967) states that PSYOP "effectiveness" cannot be measured quantitatively; he does not rule out assessment of this "effectiveness" by means of "reasonable" inferences."<sup>60</sup> He suggests that it is practically impossible to observe the behavior of PSYOP target audiences (presumably in denied areas) and, therefore, suggests that "effectiveness" be assessed by means of studying attitudes, values, and opinions.

Our contention is that "immediate effects" are more amenable to study in many cases than are the longer term effects embodied in attitudes, values, and opinions. By immediate effects, we mean those effects which are immediately observable, such as communications efficiency measures (attention to the message and comprehension), and heightened awareness, increased levels of information, and direct behavioral response (as opposed to delayed behavioral response). Changes in attitude, values, and opinion are not unimportant, but they tend to be longer-term effects of persuasion, and are therefore difficult to inferentially link with the persuasion itself.

Precise data of the sort needed for PSYOP effects analysis are difficult to come by in a combat situation. The criteria of scientific proof

must be deferred in favor of the "reasonable inference" based upon the best available data. Our intention in this report, apart from stimulating further debate on effects analysis, is to provide some tools for drawing better "reasonable inferences" and ways of generating better data.

#### BASIC APPROACH TO INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT

The gap between program operations personnel and program evaluation personnel is almost universally acknowledged. Operations "types" have little patience with those who wish to modify resource allocation or basic approach to provide for a later "evaluation." Research and evaluation "types" argue that this will not handicap the program, and indeed will improve its functioning by providing feedback on the effectiveness and efficiency of different program "treatments" and different delivery techniques. Wholey (1970) suggested that since there are seldom enough resources to go around in a program and since the true value of those resources (in terms of program impact) which do go around is unknown, there is good reason to systematically vary the distribution of those programs components.<sup>61</sup>

It seems unlikely that PSYOP operators are going to advocate or implement "planned variation" in PSYOP simply for the purpose of determining how much of what kind of PSYOP yields what apparent effects. In time of war, everyone's function is assumed to be essential, whether, in fact, it is or not. Yet one could argue that whereas two loudspeakers provide minimal support, yielding X prisoners, might not four loudspeakers yield 2X prisoners, or 4X, or, through some unexplained mechanism, 10X? Over the longer term, such systematic variation and actual withholding of support in some units might pay great dividends in terms of more effective future employment of PSYOP assets.

This may be suggested to some degree in the sections which follow. The use of "semantic tracers," for example, is an approach which makes sense only if its utilization can be restricted to a certain operation or geographic area, since it is intended to "tag" those persons who have either been exposed to specific PSYOP campaigns, or who have acquired the "tracer"

through secondary diffusion (that is, they have "learned" it from some source other than the PSYOP media, and that source learned it from our PSYOP).

#### Underlying Concepts

The various approaches to indicator development contained in this report are discussed briefly in this chapter. A key concept developed for this study is the "indicator generator," a technique which involves insertion of recognizable objects or trace measures into PSYOP messages or media, without affecting the actual PSYOP mission itself. Another is the "semantic tracer," which is a variety of the indicator generator, but which has potential of emerging in the actual cultural environment of the target country. A third concept is the "economics of attention," which seeks to affect the ways in which members of the target audience spend and organize the time available to them.<sup>62</sup>

In addition to developing these concepts, methods for stimulating data from the denied area are suggested. While some may view these approaches as "trickery" or "gimmicks," it should be pointed out that this is probably due to the fact that the approaches are unconventional and therefore unfamiliar. Certainly, trade-offs are involved from several standpoints, and the uses of the techniques may be limited or even precluded by judgmental considerations or even by prevailing norms and conventions regarding the treatment of prisoners-of-war. Any of the approaches described below which might violate the Geneva Convention in any specific situation should not be used.

One compelling feature of the requirement which led to this study was that of "going beyond" such conventional methodologies as sample surveys, analysis of interrogation data, content analysis, and direct observation. This, together with the denied area stipulation, left relatively little in the way of possibilities. It is apparent that the three or four kinds of primary data collection mentioned here represent the probable range of

approaches which can be used without elaborate arrangements requiring extensive planning well in advance of the psychological operations. The constraints were accepted with reservations, due to the strong possibility that any new approaches might have to be supplemented by already existing approaches in order to be workable. Thus, any "new" indicators are likely to depend on combinations of new and old methodologies, or simply new applications of existing ones.

What clearly needs to be done is to introduce a certain degree of predetermined accountability into the effects analysis process. By predetermined accountability, we mean that it is necessary that the PSYOP operator specify in advance what the PSYOP objective(s) being served by the campaign is, what kind of response is being sought to achieve the objective, and what (indicators) to look for to signal that the desired response has been elicited. Having done this, it is also necessary that the process by which the response will be elicited be specified in detail, and that alternative explanations of the response be identified. This places the PSYOP operator in the position of having to make predictions and offer explanations and to think critically about possible alternative explanations.

#### "Indicator Generator" Approach

Essentially, the task of developing new concepts, with data collection and analysis procedures, for research on the effects of psychological operations is one of establishing a framework for the PSYOP specialists to generate improved indicators of program impact and to incorporate such indicators into their program planning. The key assumption here is that the alternative of experimental impact assessment of psychological operation programs in the field is and will remain infeasible in the vast majority of cases, and thus considerable reliance must continue to be placed on indicators which can be assessed after PSYOP and outside of a controlled situation.

Furthermore, in order to obtain adequate indicators, special attention must be given to including elements in PSYOP programs which generate indicators - that is, the PSYOP activity per se does not appear to produce easily measurable

traces (or indicators) to the extent of many other types of programs. If this is accepted, then particular attention should be given to consciously attaching indicator generators to PSYOP programs.

To clarify this, we mean by "indicator generators" any program component, activity associated with a program, or activity conducted parallel to a program which tends to produce "traces," outcomes, or observable behavior - that is, indicators on which data can be collected and assessed, and on which the data collection and assessment can be used as substitute measures of impacts of the program in question. The principle is that of attaching an activity which does produce adequate measures to one which does not (the main PSYOP effort), and by the close association of the two activities using indicators of impact of the former as proxy measures for the latter.

There are several distinct advantages to the "indicator generator" or "substitute measure" approach over placing sole reliance on indicators of the PSYOP activity itself.

- First, since the "indicator generator" would be specifically designed to provide more obvious effects than the associated PSYOP activity proper, less precision in measurement would be required in the field to obtain worthwhile results. The approach is thus particularly suited for timely application by PSYOP units in the field, and meets the objective of providing assessment tools which can be used outside of controlled experimental contexts;
- Second, "indicator generators" can be explicitly designed for specific limited access situations, to provide traces in which direct measurement of impact is likely to be infeasible;
- Third, certain "indicator generators" (for example, aid to detecting size of audience) may be applied relatively free of the specific PSYOP message content and situational context, and hence would help overcome the obstacles to effects measurement inherent in the variety of PSYOP activities which require examination;

- Fourth, the approach encourages the PSYOP program operator to begin to think in terms of how to maximize his chances of worthwhile feedback on program effects, without requiring him to become involved in the intricacies of quasi-experimental program design;
- Fifth, the approach of substitute measure does not require any neglect of available direct indicators of program effect, but rather provides a supplemental tool which may reinforce or qualify other findings. The approach is, in short, flexible and directly operationally useful.

#### "Semantic Tracers" and Related Concepts

Linebarger (1950) made reference to "propaganda stained with semantic tracers."<sup>63</sup> His specific reference was that our propaganda was not stained with such tracers, and there is no clear indication of what he meant by the term "semantic tracers." It does seem plausible that items could be deliberately inserted into psychological operations messages which would later provide trace measures of: 1) the actual receipt and attention to -- and perhaps comprehension of the messages; and 2) the diffusion of parts of the content of the message. These items might take the form of unusual usages of language, such as odd combinations of words or words which are rarely used but commonly understood, original jokes which might or might not contain propaganda references (such as political humor directed at the regime, ourselves, or anachronistic customs), songs which were formerly popular and which might be re-popularized with altered lyrics which do not change the basic meaning of these lyrics, or perhaps parody versions of popular or traditional songs. The use of parody songs is not new to propaganda, but their use as trace measures might be improved.

Another kind of item might take the form of bits of useful though innocuous information which are not generally known in the target population. An example would be little known techniques for controlling agricultural pests, or perhaps "household hints" of some sort. The messages with trace items implanted, or presented in association with the messages, could be introduced via radio or, to a more limited extent, through leaflets or

newssheets, either in a deliberately limited area or throughout the target society -- depending on the measurement objectives.

If the purpose of introducing the tracers is to observe diffusion of media output through secondary transmission, the message might be broadcast with low power to limit its reception, or broadcast to an area where reception might be limited by geographic features of the area. The trace might then be watched for in target society media output, in interrogations, in traveler commentaries, or in either intercepted or otherwise available communications coming out of the target society. For example, if an original joke were included in a broadcast to an inland sector of Poland, it would be interesting to find out whether the joke would be familiar to Polish-speaking sailors in Gdansk (Danzig) or in a third country port where ships from Gdansk (Danzig) are docked. One could then begin pursuing a line of inquiry which might establish the pattern of diffusion: Where did the sailors first hear the joke? Was it from someone else or from printed or electronic media? When did they hear it? How does the version they know differ from the original version? Are there also reports in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) or similar files of the joke? What media sources contain references to the joke? Where are they originated, and what are the dates/times of transmission or publication?

The use of music with altered lyrics offers an opportunity to obtain a rough indicator of the extent to which a station is listened to on a regular basis. Again, the alteration of the lyrics does not change the basic meaning of those lyrics, but an article here and there or substitution of names in the lyrics makes it possible to observe:

- Whether the song becomes popularized in its slightly changed version;
- Whether the original version of the song is re-popularized;
- Whether the popularization is local, regional or nationwide;
- Whether it is commonly sung in cities and towns visited by third party observers;
- What media channels and stations broadcast it, and in what versions;

- Whether the altered version is recorded and sold in the target country, and, if so, where;
- Does the regime show any reaction to the song's introduction? How? (denunciations, warnings, etc. -- via mass media).

Parody of popular and traditional songs was used in Vietnam, to the chagrin of the North Vietnamese military elite. North Vietnamese troops were reported to have responded enthusiastically to the introduction of the parody songs via PSYOP broadcasts by frequently singing the "unauthorized" versions.<sup>26</sup> The U. S. Army has also had its experience with attempts to suppress parody songs which were deemed detrimental to morale or discipline. The popular song, "Moving On," was parodied during the Korean conflict by U. S. troops, and was reported to have been forbidden (in its parody version) by military authorities.<sup>64</sup>

Parody songs can be introduced by radio, loudspeaker, or by leaflet. A major advantage of introducing them by leaflet is that leaflet drops can be carefully controlled so that greater selectivity may be exercised, and trace measures deliberately implanted. The technique for introducing parody via leaflet might be the printing of the lyrics, along with the suggestion, "sung to the tune of...."

The popularization of parody songs may serve to provide a ready indicator of the relative efficiency of a particular communications medium in reaching the target audience. A basic question which must always be considered by the PSYOP operator is "how can I reach my audience?" If the PSYOP operator wishes to use radio broadcasts, he needs to know how many of the target audience have access to radios of the appropriate type. He also needs to know at what time the members of the target audience listen. Parody songs provide one ready trace measure for feedback. If a particular parody is broadcast, and, a few days later, captured documents or communications intercepts indicate an attempt to suppress or discourage the singing of such songs among the target audience, the PSYOP operator may infer that either the target audience has radios for listening, and this worries the regime in that area, or that the parody may be spreading rapidly via secondary

transmission. Several parodies of different songs, or several versions of the same parody might be prepared and used at different times in order to obtain feedback on the listening times.

Of course, confirmation from several sources is desirable, and media output in the target society may reflect concern with or perhaps even popularization of the parodies. Knowledge of the parodies may also show up in interrogation of prisoners, refugees, or defectors (or other informants). Playing of the tune with a tape recording could be used as a kind of stimulus, with the person being interrogated asked to provide the lyrics he knows to the tune. The line of questioning proceeds, with the person encouraged to describe any other versions which he may know.

Use of unusual words or syntax in slogans which are repetitively broadcast or used in print along with obscure facts which can be incorporated into otherwise interesting PSYOP messages also may be used as a trace measure of reception and diffusion. The traces may be monitored in media output from the target society, traveler commentaries or interrogations. Where interrogations of travelers are sources of feedback, the tachistoscope may be used to elicit recognition of word patterns, slogans or facts obscure to the subject (e.g., "Calvin Coolidge was the 29th President of the United States". Actually he was not the 29th President. It would be interesting to see what sort of response, if any, such an assertion brings forth from the denied area. In fact, it would be almost as interesting to see if any feedback came from the population outside the denied area.)

The dissemination of useful information is another technique which could be used to obtain indicators of the extent to which a particular PSYOP medium is attended and understood in a given target population. For example, "household hints" might be used to affect consumer behavior in readily visible ways. In this age of international commerce, not to mention scarcity, shifts in consumer behavior in response to PSYOP might be telling. Assume that we are broadcasting to a society in which most homes have refrigerators, and that that country imports most of its bicarbonate of soda from one company in, say, England. Our radio proceeds to spice its propaganda broadcasts with the observation that bicarbonate of soda can be used to absorb refrigerator

odors very effectively. A sudden surge in replacement orders for bicarbonate of soda from local merchants might then indicate that our radio does indeed reach its audience. This simplistic and perhaps foolish example may have more reasonable counterparts in the real world. Again, interrogations might be conducted with an eye to detecting awareness of these obscure bits of information which are associated with our PSYOP communications.

#### The Economics of Attention

In time of war, it is especially important that a regime have the allegiance of its subjects (citizens, constituents, resources), as well as their attention in an efficient manner. The way in which time is organized is vital to the functioning of a society. The division of labor in industrial society may differ from that of agricultural society in that the workday is no longer a function of daylight. With adequate power, factories can operate around the clock. Night shifts can boost output. Broadcast schedules and publication deadlines are organized to coincide with prevailing activity patterns in society. We have the six o'clock news, the morning newspaper, music and spots of news during the workday. Leisure events (e.g., sports) are broadcast during leisure hours. The supply and demand relationship is in balance.

The regime uses the media of mass communication to inform, persuade, entertain, and instruct. Orders are announced. Warnings are given. New regulations are promulgated. Promises are made in the form of forecasts. Reminders are made to parents, workers, persons of military service age, non-citizens, travelers, and everyone affected by the war effort to have children vaccinated and registered for school, to work harder and conserve materiel, to provide current information to draft boards, to report current addresses to authorities, not to travel to certain areas, and to do whatever is good for the regime's war programs. For such communication to be effective on a large scale, it is necessary to have the attention of large numbers of the populace at the right times.

Linder (1970) writes, "Time, like other economic resources, cannot be accumulated. We cannot build up a stock of time as we build up a stock of capital. As it passes, however, time puts into people's hands something they can use. In economic terms, there exists a supply of time.

"But there is also a demand for time --- It is important to realize that consumption requires time just as does production."<sup>65</sup>

Time is a precious resource to the threatened nation. It must be well organized. It is related to communication, to production, to the general well-being of the most precious asset of the regime - a healthy, highly motivated, and willing work force with good work habits and a sense of the importance of time. This also obtains for the military establishment. The ideal worker listens to the regime's instructions, believes in the regime's programs, works efficiently for the regime's prescribed workday, conserves precious resources such as electricity, fuel, foodstuffs, and money (savings), sees that his children are kept healthy and loyal, and gets adequate nutrition and rest so that he may continue to follow good work and political habits. Heaven forbid that he should become indifferent to his work, tardy, addicted to such time-wasters as playing solitaire, reading trashy novels, or late-night radio or television programs - in short, oriented to time as a consumer rather than as a productive member of society. It is also to be hoped that he will not become an individualist or that he will not engage in such wasteful activities as hobbies, which might divert energies needed for the state's productive work.

For the PSYOP operator, the economics of attention, as we shall call the supply-demand relationship between available time and activity, presents an opportunity to: 1) be disruptive of a regime we oppose; and 2) create indicators which can provide feedback, which may be of sufficient magnitude to be treated quantitatively as well as qualitatively. The disruption (and likely impairment of productive activity for the regime) may be accomplished by means of interfering with the rest-work cycle in the society. Assume that the workers typically get up at 0500 and are at work by 0700 for a given shift. Given a customary eight hours of sleep, this means that they are in bed by 2100. Interrogations, analysis of popular media, and other intelligence data can be used to build a map of the typical worker's use of time in the target country. What does the worker do at the end of his ten-hour shift? Where

and for how long does he have lunch? Is it customary to stop for a beer or tea before going home, or do workers usually proceed straight home? Is it customary to read the paper after supper? How much radio listening and when (and what kind)?

Armed with this kind of typical schedule, the PSYOP operator can begin to offer alternative ways for the worker to use his time. The worker can be encouraged to stay up late by means of radio programs which last past the customary bedtimes. Perhaps radio dramas which initially fit nicely into the worker's evening schedule, say finishing up at 2100, could be expanded so that they last until 2130, and later reprogrammed so that they begin at 2100 and last until 2200, thus depriving the worker who likes to listen to them of an hour's sleep.

Sports events also offer interesting possibilities for broadcast in the evenings. Attractive, exciting programs might be sequenced with appropriate lead-ins to keep the worker up until midnight, with possible consequences for his efficiency and motivation the following day. The programs might be used to plant suggestions of individualism and ways to obtain benefits from the state, hobbies which will provide useful products for the family, and numerous ways to "waste time" and use up resources. If a series of rebroadcasts of sports matches or dramas are found to be quite popular, the PSYOP station could schedule them occasionally for workdays and encourage workers to call in sick. They might be encouraged to try certain foods and recipes, paint their homes, repair furniture, take up hobbies which involve them in tasks which are challenging and take time to complete (but which perhaps can be completed in a single evening by staying up late), or try games with the family which also will lead to late hours.

The economics of attention can also be used to generate indicators in several ways. First, there is the obvious point that the regime may be so threatened by the economics of attention approach that they try to suppress the broadcasts through jamming, warnings to the population not to listen, threats, penalties for listening, or attempts to compete by broadcasting

similar programs locally at more reasonable times. In the classic experience of the past thirty years, we might expect denunciations of "decadent" trashy broadcasts which attempt to weaken the will of the people -- exactly the point.

Second, the economics of attention might be combined with observation in the denied area. We might want to know how many households receive our programs during the evening in a given town or village. The town or village might be observed by means of satellite photography, long-distance airborne photography, or other means on successive night, with late-night broadcasting being introduced on two or three nights; counts could be made of the number of houses with lights on at late hours and comparisons made for concomitant variation. On days when special events are being broadcast or after late-night programs, aerial photographs might be made of recreation areas of factory sites or worker formations (if such are typical of the society being studied) and headcounts made on successive days to see if any decrease in worker attendance is noted after programs which interfere with sleep or on days when malingering is encouraged. It would also be worth considering to monitor local media for news of production problems at the factories, disciplinary actions against workers for malingering or slacking, or admonitions not to listen to enemy radio broadcasts.

### THIRD COUNTRY APPROACHES

The use of third parties in many types of research has been long accepted in the social sciences. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have customarily used independent research organizations to gather data by means of interviewing travelers from their target countries to obtain effects analysis data.<sup>66</sup> Quite aside from the logistic practicality of using a third party, there are also certain obvious advantages. For example, while the traveler might shy away from an interview with personnel from RFE or RL, they may readily grant such an interview to a research organization having no conspicuous link to the radio operations in question. The individual may feel less threatened politically talking to a third party, since it is more "respectable" to give a research interview than to cooperate in an intelligence interrogation.

Third country resources represent still another source of indicator development and the related data acquisition. Organizations located in third countries have the advantage of freer communications via normal channels with the countries on both sides of the conflict. Assuming that we are talking about countries which are nominally neutral, commercial establishments within these countries might be used to provide a number of services to effects analysis personnel ranging from mail forwarding to distribution of free gifts to listeners in the target countries, and even conducting certain kinds of discrete surveys in industrialized countries. Examples of the kinds of services such organization could render for effects analysis include but are not limited to:

- Distribution of different kinds of inexpensive gifts or premiums to listeners who write to the commercial establishments, thereby providing access to those who are paying attention to the PSYOP, since the awareness of the availability of the premiums on gifts would be through "advertising" messages transmitted via PSYOP media. A number of characteristics of the audience might then be inferred from the basic information supplied by the requestor (e.g., Mr. or Mrs., name, address, nature of item requested, and particular facts about the location of the notice which led to the request - for example, items advertised over radio at times when certain categories of people would be unlikely to be listening);
- Telephone or mail surveys to ascertain awareness among a given sample of carefully planted information (e.g., "trivia" or "semantic tracers");
- In the case of a neutral nation, a special mail drop might be set up to enable families and friends of prisoners-of-war to communicate with them or to send gifts. While this might be viewed in one sense as a humanitarian arrangement, especially in the cases of those nations who will not forward mail directly to the country with which they are at war (e.g., countries which they do not "recognize"), it might also be possible to generate large amounts of data useful to effects analysis through such an arrangement.

As an example, if the address of the third country mail drop has been broadcast or disseminated by leaflet, the mere act of sending a letter or package to the specified address indicates that members of the target audience were exposed to the PSYOP. By making periodic changes in the address (but not necessarily failing to forward mail from the old address), it might be possible to monitor the number of correctly addressed letters or packages versus those still bearing the old address to assess the extent to which listening to broadcasts is continuous. The return addresses would provide information about the geographic distribution and possibly the ethnic make-up of the listening audience or of those who had obtained the address through print media. Subtle variations in the third country address might provide keys to specific PSYOP media, specific leaflets, or specific broadcast days or times. It would be a simple matter to maintain several different addresses for this purpose and tabulate the numbers of responses sent to each.

Attempts might be made to maintain a continuing inventory of what items were sent through parcels to POWs, make specific recommendations regarding the comfort needs of prisoners and tally the frequency with which these items appear in packages. It might further be possible, since mail will be routinely opened and examined as a security measure, to subject the contents to qualitative and quantitative content analysis to identify specific opinions and value patterns being expressed in these letters, as well as reports of local conditions and events. While there is every reason to believe that the letters would be censored prior to forwarding to the third country address, it is also possible that the item bearing considerable PSYOP value would get past the censors who may regard this kind of chit-chat as having no military value. Whether it proves to have military value will have to be determined by actually pursuing such analyses on a pilot basis.

If enough information gets past the censors to permit systematic content analysis, tabulations might be made for a specific geographic area and patterns of content monitored for changes over time which might in some way be attributable to PSYOP (e.g., more frequent references to concerns which PSYOP seeks to sharpen, more frequent references to areas of concern which might indicate PSYOP vulnerabilities). In fact the analysis might even include the estimated numbers of words censored out of the letters as this might vary over time and might through relation to other known variables

such as geographic location or ethnicity of respondent be relatable to recent PSYOP exposure. Although it is not clear at this time just how the linkage might be inferred, certainly if censorship for a particular ethnic group's letters or of letters from a particular geographic area which had been exposed to a particular leaflet campaign tended to increase remarkably while censorship of letters from others did not so increase, this might indicate important changes in the content of the letters or the attitude of the regime toward those population groups

#### INTERROGATION, INTERVIEWS, AND TESTS

Another group of indicators would certainly be related to exploitation of those members of the target audience who come under our control. This would include prisoners-of-war, defectors, refugees, members of local populations in insurgency situations, and civilians in an area which has recently come under consolidation. There are well known limitations on the extent to which prisoners can be exploited, the chief limitations being rules laid down by the Geneva Convention.

"Every prisoner-of-war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information.

"---No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners-of-war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners-of-war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind."<sup>67</sup>

Of course to the extent that prisoners willingly cooperate, the requirements of the Geneva Convention are met. Experience with prisoners-of-war in the Pacific during World War II demonstrated that culture may operate to make prisoners surprisingly cooperative when this change in status is realized. Japanese prisoners were most anxious to cooperate (one might even say "collaborate") with their captors, since they perceived themselves as no longer having any standing in the Japanese Army.<sup>68</sup>

Studies of North Korean and Chinese prisoners-of-war in the early 1950's revealed that Chinese troops and North Korean enlisted men tended to be cooperative in interviews, although it must candidly be said that there were large groups that refused to be interviewed.<sup>69</sup> Inspection of interrogation reports from Vietnam indicates that the interrogators actually succeeded in getting the information sought, although it is not known just how much of the information was given voluntarily and how much was given under coercion.

In any case, the legal restrictions on prisoner-of-war exploitation must be observed, and the extent to which such voluntary cooperation as that of prisoners is not forthcoming will of course introduce biases of unknown kind and number into the data. Among the techniques recommended for use in PSYOP effects assessment, in interviews, interrogation and tests are recognition tests, recall tests and information tests.

#### Recognition Tests

This is simply a test to ascertain whether an individual has seen a given piece of printed PSYOP or heard a particular radio broadcast. The printed matter might be displayed in multiple-choice form (one leaflet actually used together with three decoy leaflets which have not been used or leaflets flashed in sequence on a screen by means of a tachistoscope, which permits the leaflet to be seen but which shows it so briefly that the individual will be able to describe it only if he has seen it before). Where indicator generators involving printed decorative symbols are used on leaflets, the decorative symbols might be displayed again with "decoy" symbol presentations and the prisoner asked which symbol he has seen. Where radio broadcasts are concerned, a prisoner might be given several slogans or program titles or names of announcers, together with a decoy slogan program name and announcer name and asked to select the one he recognizes.

In any of these recognition tests, there is bound to be a certain amount of random error resulting from confusion or guessing on the prisoner's part. A way to minimize this error might be to develop scores based on the number of correct recognitions for each prisoner, subtracting the number of incorrect

"recognitions" (corrected for the number of multiple choice alternatives in each question). Other items might also be used to define the estimate of the number of prisoners giving correct and valid recognition responses. Where prisoners give correct recognition responses and at the same time show a generally higher level of information relative to the PSYOP content, this increases our confidence that they were indeed exposed to the PSYOP in question.

#### Recall Tests

Some kinds of PSYOP content will be more appropriately incorporated into recall items rather than recognition items. For example, slogans which might be a key part of a PSYOP broadcast or program titles which are regular features might be incorporated into sentence completion (i.e., slogan completion or title completion) tests. Other recall tests which are discussed in the following chapter include semantic tracer items such as playing a tune on a tape recorder and then having the prisoner supply the words to the tune, rating recall on the basis of whether the words to the tune are the original (perhaps traditional) version or a popularized version promoted through the PSYOP broadcasts.

Numerous other recall test items could be devised using semantic tracers, including answers to riddles, correct answers to innocuous but factual questions, or any of the other kinds of items which might relate to the broad category of semantic tracers. Where recall tests are used in an individual interview or interrogation situation, the prisoner's cooperation might be enhanced by reinforcing the tendency to give correct answers through some sort of award such as a cigarette for a correct answer or a cup of coffee at some critical point in the test.

#### Information Tests

One of the objectives of this study is to provide alternative sources of information for the numbers of the target audience. To the extent that the individual has assimilated the information into this frame of reference, he will tend to take that into account in formulating the assumptions which govern his behavior. It is reasonable to expect that he will be able to feed-back more accurate information regarding the policies and objectives of which we have tried to make him aware in our PSYOP than will the person who has not assimilated the information into this frame of reference.

Therefore, two kinds of information tests are suggested. One would be a test which for efficiency's sake might take the form of a multiple choice test which seeks to explore systematically the kinds of knowledge or information the respondent has regarding the content of various PSYOP media and campaigns (i.e., the themes and details related to the themes). A second kind of test might have to do with questions about the best course of behavior. The individual is presented with a situation and then asked what the probable consequences would be from particular behaviors or what specific behavior should an individual exhibit in given situations. (Example - a person attempting to rally should follow very specific procedures.)

#### Other Approaches

Inadequate as existing indicators may be, it is difficult to improve on them, except perhaps to systematize them, given the present state-of-the-art and of technology. With regard to opinion, values and behavior, several kinds of possible indicators are discussed in Chapter VI. These are advanced in a highly tentative way, since, for the most part, it is rather difficult to link attitudes, opinions, values and deferred behavior to PSYOP. Areas discussed are direct observation of behavior, inferences regarding opinions, attitudes, and values from behavior and reported behavior, different kinds of content analysis of media output and prisoner-of-war mail, content analysis of prisoner-of-war essays, and existing "pencil and paper" methodologies for the study of values.

#### SUMMARY

This chapter provides a reformulation of the study objectives which were presented in Chapter I and suggests possible kinds of indicators which will be explored more systematically in Chapters V and VI. Among the approaches discussed were the "indicator generator" approach, "semantic tracers," third country resources, the economics of attention, exploitation of prisoners-of-war and civilians, different kinds of interrogation, interview, and test approaches, and approaches which tend to generate data. This general discussion of concepts is intended to set the stage for the chapters on indicators of attention, comprehension, and response which follow.

## CHAPTER V

### INDICATORS OF ATTENTION

#### GENERAL

A major handicap in an international political communication is that, owing to the lack of feedback, one can never be certain just how large an audience is being reached, or whether the right kind of audience is being reached. Some assumptions are made about the audiences to which a particular program content will appeal, but even here there is a great deal of uncertainty. Given the character of a denied area, it is unlikely that this uncertainty will ever be reduced beyond a certain point, but there are several kinds of indicators and related data gathering approaches which can be used to obtain rough indications of audience composition.

First, there is the basic audience analysis which should provide data about the tastes of various target audiences. This is usually based on either existing documentary resources, surveys of indigenous domestic media output in the target area and inferences about the audiences to which they are addressed, and "expert" opinion regarding the media preferences of the target audience. In addition, the adoption of public opinion surveys by nations which have been considered closed societies has added to the kinds of available information about audience composition and preference. In fact, recent data on media preferences in the Soviet Union has been published in the open literature.<sup>70</sup>

It is also possible that in some situations such as a counterinsurgency situation, strategic PSYOP leaflets for broadcast may be directed to the government controlled area near a contested or enemy controlled area and surveys conducted to ascertain whether such target groups in the area paid attention to particular messages and media, and whether they understood and believed the messages. Although understanding of the messages is dealt with in the following chapter, it may be said here that various kinds of interview approaches, such as the focused interview in which the meaning of the

communication is discussed with the respondents who have paid attention to it and judgments made by trained interviewers as to how well the message was understood, might be used. In contested areas where surveys are difficult because of the vulnerability of the population to acts of terror and hence their willingness to cooperate in surveys is a problem, there are several devices which might be used. These are presented in the section of this chapter on local civilians.

The presentation which follows is concerned with communications efficiency indicators to different kinds of audiences using different types of media. The indicator concepts are presented without regard to immediate feasibility, allocation of PSYOP assets, or reference to specific types of warfare, except in passing. Those concepts which are not presently feasible are presented nevertheless because they may become feasible at some time in the future. A basic use of the indicators presented is to illustrate the ways in which the indicator generator concept may be used and to provide suggestions for data collection approaches.

AUDIENCE: FRONTLINE TROOPS

Media: Broadcast and/or Loudspeaker

A major characteristic of this audience from a PSYOP standpoint is its relative accessibility for effects analysis. In some respects, frontline troops of opposing sides are often in contact -- trying to kill one another. Their behavior leaves recognizable traces -- e.g., discarded trash, an abandoned campsite or fortification, equipment and personal effects of battle casualties and forgotten items. Such common traces as empty cans and the volume of spent brass can be important clues to the enemy's supply situation, his battle discipline, and the length of time a position was occupied.

Another way in which the audience is more accessible for effects analysis is, of course, that prisoners and defectors are taken. Skillful interrogations and, later, interviews can be of great value in assessing PSYOP effects. On the other hand, some of the kinds of indicators which

are useful with regard to homefront audiences are totally infeasible where frontline units are concerned.

Ideally, one would hope to be able to obtain data on attention to broadcasts and loudspeaker missions before capture of enemy personnel, but the circumstances usually preclude this. The measure of attention and the measure of effect (information level, attitude, opinion, and behavior) where the individual soldier is concerned are likely to be one and the same, except where enemy personnel can be observed or interviewed directly. Such "indicators" as heavy fire (or heavy weapons fire) directed at loudspeaker teams may not have particular meaning unless the enemy normally tolerates such broadcasts; even then, the significance of this is uncertain unless prisoners can be taken and asked why the fire was so directed. It is conceivable that the loudspeakers were not sufficiently audible to the enemy troops and therefore were considered an irritant in this case.

Since prisoners are usually available in some numbers, an incidental sample might be interviewed about the broadcasts and subjected to a few screening questions. Bearing in mind our "indicator generator" concept, consider the kinds which might be implanted in PSYOP broadcasts to troops and their related indicators.

Slogan. The indicator for this might be recall of the slogan, elicited in response to a sentence completion test or other projective test. Care must be taken that the slogan is unique to the particular PSYOP campaign under consideration, and not simply borrowed from other contexts (e.g., popular music).

Song Lyrics. The indicator might be the ability of a prisoner to write out or recite the lyrics of a particular song or songs played on PSYOP broadcasts. The songs should either be newly composed and set to available music -- e.g., instrumental music for which no other lyrics exist, as in the case of much of the classical music of Europe -- or perhaps parody lyrics of well-known songs.

Facts not well known to the target audience. The indicator could be free recall of the facts or aided recognition (such as multiple-choice tests). Free recall is preferable, since error due to random guessing is minimized. An example of the kinds of facts which might be used is historical (how many Chinese know when the French celebrate Bastille Day?). Drucher (1970) states: "A phenomenon, known to every newspaper editor, is the amazingly high readership and retention of the fillers, the little three- or five-line bits of irrelevant incidental information that are being used to balance a page. Why should anybody want to read, let alone remember when and where baking powder was first used? Yet there is no doubt that they are remembered far better than almost anything else in the daily paper except the great screaming headlines of the catastrophies. The answer is that these fillers make no demands. It is precisely their total irrelevancy that accounts for their being remembered."<sup>71</sup>

Special instructions for surrender or movement. The instructions should be of such a nature that they would have no effect on the actual act of surrender or movement, only to attach a visible signal to the PSYOP operator that the message had been heard. The signal in this case is the "trace" measure -- an example might be tying a strip of cloth through a buttonhole or on the muzzle of the weapon while preparing to surrender.

Numerous similar indicator generators can be developed for use in PSYOP to produce trace measures in later prisoner (or refugee) interrogations. In addition to whether the "trace" is present in the interrogation/interview, we would want to know by what process the "trace" was implanted in the subject's consciousness -- by listening to radio, by secondary transmission, or perhaps from his own media (which may have picked it up from our PSYOP media). The relative absence of the "trace" in the target population could be ascertained by pretesting.

Kinds of "indicator generators" which might be used to provide data in the absence of large numbers of prisoners might include broadcast content

which, while ordinarily relatively harmless, could provoke an irritated reaction on the part of the military or political elite. An example might be the "parody songs" which were successfully introduced and popularized among North Vietnamese Army troops in 1972, by radio, and which were the subject of stern warnings in the Army newspaper.<sup>26</sup>

#### Media: Print

Print media directed to frontline enemy troops is usually in the form of leaflets (including safe-conduct passes), newssheets, and posters. Posters are much less common than leaflets and newssheets, but may be suitable for use in insurgency situations. Magazines may also be considered, although these are difficult to distribute to enemy troops. Media items which can be passed on (i.e., leaflets, magazines, newssheets) are of primary concern here, although some of the suggested "indicator generator" applications are also appropriate to posters.

Leaflets. Leaflets are the most common form of print communication with enemy troops, primarily because they can be delivered in such large quantities from aircraft. Where enemy troops lack access to radio receivers, leaflets or newssheets may represent the only means by which communication can be established for PSYOP. Leaflets are also preferred because of their size -- easily concealable in one's shirt pocket -- and for the "safe-conduct pass" feature.

"Indicator generators" may be utilized in several ways with leaflets, depending on the situation. The "indicator generators" may take one of several forms.

Colorful, decorative symbols printed on the leaflet such as geometric forms or other symbols (not corresponding to those common to the culture of the recipient). The indicator of attention to specific leaflets could be recognition of those leaflets with the symbols (but without text) presented with "decoy" leaflets -- not previously used -- in a multiple-choice format,

or presented tachistoscopically. Recognition of a given leaflet's symbol could be supplemented by independent recall of the leaflet's actual content (i.e., whether a nostalgic poem, warning, safe-conduct pass, etc.).

Odd facts printed on the leaflets, which do not detract from the message or purpose of the leaflets. For example, they might be presented in a "Did you know...?" fashion. Again, as in the case of broadcasting, these would have to be facts established as not well-known among the target audience, and subject to the same caveats when used as "indicator generators." They might well have the added benefit of increasing leaflet circulation when they provide some diversion to the recipients. The indicator of attention associated with this could be recall of the "odd facts" in response to interview questions.

Stubs on leaflets were used in Vietnam, but there are several possible forms stubs can take. The stub used in Vietnam, contained the radio frequency of the Voice of America,<sup>72</sup> and could be retained after the rest of the leaflet was discarded. Possession of a given stub by a newly captured prisoner or rallier would be an indication that he had probably seen the leaflet that it came from. The stub might be made valuable in a number of ways, to increase retention, and provide trace measures specific to a variety of leaflets. Kinds of stubs might include miniature calendars, tables of weights and measures, personal leave record, pay tables for military or civil service grades, pencil-and-paper games such as tic-tac-toe (which would, of course, be discarded after use, thus providing trace measures of leaflets having been received by personnel in particular locations). Stubs retained could be interpreted as possible indication, as stated above, that a prisoner had probably seen a given leaflet.

Numbered safe-conduct leaflets. To encourage retention of leaflets, which provide an indication of attention to the leaflets, a rewards program keyed to a weekly or monthly lottery might be used. Enemy soldiers could be encouraged by radio and by leaflet to regard the safe-conduct pass as a color-coded "lottery ticket," each version good for a monthly drawing.<sup>73</sup> The enemy

soldier defecting within 30 days with this version of the leaflet would be eligible to win a substantial sum of money. Since there would be no way of knowing how many leaflets were lost or destroyed, this might encourage enemy troops to defect if they believed themselves reasonably close to the announced number, which of course, was announced in a subsequent leaflet drop or radio broadcast. The technique might also create considerable suspicion and conflict among enemy troops, especially where their leaders are concerned.

Special inks and dyes for tactical leaflets. During tactical operations, it is often necessary to use PSYOP leaflets. To obtain reasonably good data on which prisoners (or enemy casualties) were exposed to PSYOP leaflets during the operation, a device is suggested here which would require special equipment, but, given the present state of technology, appears to be quite feasible.

It is frequently desirable to use leaflets to induce trapped enemy forces (or enemy units not trapped, for that matter) to surrender without a fight. A given leaflet may prompt a soldier to a decision or create doubts and fears which render him less effective in battle. An indicator which has been in fairly common use for effects analysis is the actual possession of leaflets by surrendering, captured or dead enemy troops.<sup>37</sup> But what of the troops who pick up and read a leaflet and then discard it because they either do not wish to retain it or are afraid to do so? Leaflets could be impregnated with a special dye which would phosphoresce under ultraviolet light (such inks and dyes do exist) and which would transfer to moist skin upon contact. A small, portable ultraviolet lamp could then be used to check the hands of prisoners and casualties for traces of the dye after the battle. Comparisons could then be made of the number of prisoners, ralliers, and casualties exposed to leaflets.

#### AUDIENCE: LOCAL CIVILIANS

Most of the "indicator generators" and associated indicators described above for frontline troops are also applicable for broadcasts and leaflets directed to local civilians (e.g., refugees, villagers living in battle zones or contested areas). In addition to looking for "trace measures"

among civilians, there is also the obvious course of drawing inferences about attention to PSYOP from information level and observed behavior. Where local civilians are accessible, questions might be asked to assess their familiarity with U. S. policies, programs (e.g., volunteer information program), and objectives.

To a limited extent, this might be done by means of structured interviews, focusing on the more prominent themes in U. S. PSYOP directed at local civilians. Morris has described the use of observation of civilian mass behavior in the form of obeying instructions to move from village to assembly points for evacuation.<sup>37</sup> This might, of course, be developed systematically, especially if routine photographic surveillance is possible from aircraft or reconnaissance satellites. This will be discussed later in Chapter VI.

Another technique which might be used to obtain an indirect measure of attention is that of advertising products in PSYOP broadcasts and monitoring local sales trends for products (not necessarily brands). Any surge in the sales of the products could be cautiously interpreted as an indicator of attention to the broadcast. An example of a product which might be so advertised is milk or iodized salt (in areas where iodine deficiencies exist in local diet). Monitoring of sales increases might be accomplished by surveying local distributors or merchants.

#### AUDIENCE: HOMEFRONT POPULATION

The homefront population is generally a classic target for morale-oriented strategic PSYOP. Such PSYOP is designed to undermine confidence in the national leadership and war aims, generate public opinion for or against specific issues, degrade performance and efficiency of the civilian population where the war effort is concerned, and to foster negative attitudes and opinions about the likely outcome of the war. While these objectives are important, the homefront population has numerous subgroups, and although consideration of the population without respect to subgroups may be directed to the entire population, attention and response may be primarily concentrated in one or two subgroups.

Unlike frontline troops and local civilians near the front, the home-front population represents a difficult group on which to obtain data. Our access to such data has typically been through press content, traveler and defector interviews, covert intelligence sources (e.g., agent reports, diplomatic sources, etc.), and international press commentaries. Since we are, by definition, unable to freely conduct research among these populations, our efforts to identify and monitor indicators of PSYOP effects will face severe restrictions.

Even communications efficiency, which is conceptually less formidable than effects from the standpoint of indicators, appears fraught with uncertainty. Of course, studies after consolidation can provide some data, but: 1) data are needed while the area is still denied so that PSYOP can be adequately reviewed and planned; and 2) the opportunity to conduct such studies may never materialize -- for example, in North Vietnam. Thus, we are faced with a continuing need and only fragmentary data.

Existing efforts to obtain systematic data have consisted principally of content analysis studies, analysis of mail from listeners, and interviews of travelers from the denied areas, notably by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.<sup>74, 75, 76</sup> The problems of content analysis of media are chiefly of: 1) controlled media versus popular media; and 2) PSYOP-relevance. The national media of closed societies often do not reflect the concerns of the people, but rather are instruments of the state. Inferences from these media are more appropriate to studies of policy and decision-making by elites than public attitudes and opinions.<sup>9, 7, 77</sup> Letters to RFE and RL suffer from the limitation of being from a relatively small number of persons in a listener universe of unknown size. The interviews suffer from well-known limitations of selection bias, and are not projectable.

Our task, then, is to obtain evidence of communications efficiency which is related to PSYOP, and which indicates that the PSYOP is attended and understood. The former is perhaps more feasible than the latter.

The "indicator generator" concept can be used to develop indicators of attention to a particular aspect of PSYOP, but indicators of understanding require a more direct approach, and may be difficult to obtain.

It may be necessary to establish understandability (and credibility) through pretests, if possible, and to assume that understanding will accompany attention. Secondary transmission of broadcasts or printed media (e.g., through samizdat or private publications, or pass-along circulation) provide an indication that the content is understandable and credible. With these considerations in mind, the following sources of indicators are presented.

#### Media: Broadcast

Popularization of Songs. This sort of "indicator generator" may provide an indicator of whether a given PSYOP channel has a significantly large listening audience. Songs which may have been popular at one time in the target country are played with lyrics subtly altered, with repeated playing in an effort to popularize the new version in the target country. Since local artists may often "borrow" arrangements and lyrics, it would not be surprising to find the new version being played in nightclubs, concerts, over radio, and sold in record stores. If the original version is revived, it may also be regarded as an indicator, but this should be done with caution, since no "trace" measure is associated with it. The altered lyrics would provide the needed "trace."

Parody. This is hardly new to PSYOP. It was used in Vietnam, and political humor represents an area with universal appeal. Where such humor can cleverly be used to give vent to the frustrations of the target audience without offending them, it can provide a valuable "trace" as it becomes diffused into the popular culture of the target audience. The humor may recognizably surface in the international press, the "underground press" of the target country, samizdat publications, or other media. It may also be repeated by travelers from the denied area, such as tourists, businessmen, merchant seamen or journalists.

Planted Information. While dissemination of information is an important objective of PSYOP, the deliberate transmission of particular kinds of information can be an "indicator generator" in itself. This has the obvious limitation of possible futility in the face of a worldwide "information explosion," but the focus of PSYOP on particular areas of information, especially where it offers an "alternate agenda" for news and cultural affairs, can serve to create awareness of issues and interpretations and awareness of specific current facts suppressed by the regime in the denied area (e.g., the North Vietnamese press had not reported President Nixon's re-election as late as December 1972).<sup>26</sup>

Carefully selected items of information can be disseminated via PSYOP broadcasts (or print media) and awareness of this information used as an indicator of attention to the PSYOP. How might this indicator be observed? One possible approach might be through telephone surveys by third parties (i.e., organizations in third countries) across national boundaries, with items designed to gather data on media use and preferences and awareness of the planted information. Some attitude and opinion data might also be carefully sought, but this is a judgment to be made at the time of the actual planning of the survey.

Still another source of data might be feedback in letters to enemy prisoners-of-war. Information about prisoner-of-war treatment, comfort, needs, etc., might be so structured as to be recognizable when the homefront population (encouraged by PSYOP to write POWs and send parcels) responds to perceived POW concerns in letters and by sending parcels (routinely opened prior to delivery - for normal security) which could be inventoried and tabulated.

Third Country Gift Offers. A potentially useful approach to indicator generation is the use of third country gift offers. By advertising free, inexpensive gifts, offered through legitimate commercial establishments in neutral or third countries, it may be possible to develop data on: 1) audience

composition and location; 2) times of attention to broadcasts (and hence preferences); and 3) whether broadcasts are understandable. The gifts need not be expensive or bulky. They may take the form of information (e.g., recipes, reprints of professional journal articles, and children's stories), gifts with primarily symbolic value (religious objects, photographs of sports figures or famous film stars) or useful data (such as a farmer's almanac).

Ideally, the gifts should be scarce in the denied area, generally deemed useful by the target audiences, and of little resale value. The kinds of items ordered should provide clues to the nature of the target audience, as should the title, name, and address of the persons ordering the items. The items should be "advertised" only at specific times during the day (e.g., almanac at 6 A.M., recipes at 11 A.M., children's books at 5 P.M., and religious objects at 7 P.M.), so that inferences could be made as to when the announcement for a particular item was heard.

Application of the Economics of Attention. All regimes seek to maintain certain levels of organization in their society. The orderly functioning of the society depends upon certain regularities which are time-specific, such as work-shifts, rest cycles, and leisure patterns. The regime also depends on access to its citizenry through mass media for purposes of promulgating regulations, providing "official" versions of news events, and generally providing a measure of leadership to the people. For example, consider the intensive use of propaganda directed at its own citizens during the last year of World War II by Japan.<sup>78</sup>

It certainly seems that a commonly understood but unwritten objective of PSYOP is to compete effectively for the attention of the target audience, such that the PSYOP enjoys greater credibility and actual preference over the regime's mass media. The "commodity" for which PSYOP competes is attention, and attention to PSYOP is time away from the regime of the denied area. Effective application of the economics of attention can accomplish three very useful things: 1) it can function as an "indicator

generator" by disrupting normal activity cycles; 2) it can change the content of enemy media through a "yardstick indication" function<sup>34</sup> (the term "yardstick" here is borrowed from economics. By "yardstick indication," we refer to an attempt to influence enemy media programming by providing a "yardstick"-our own PSYOP media content. We may provide "better" entertainment; more credible information, and more interesting proposals for the enemy regime. To the extent that enemy media seeks to imitate our programming and furnishes more information in an effort to maintain credibility, we may regard our "yardstick indication" as successful),<sup>79</sup> provided the regime recognizes the need to do so; and 3) it provides a method of disrupting enemy time-organization through deliberately making passive entertainment available at times not convenient to the regime. Television would be the ideal medium for this, but television is a line-of-sight medium and might be infeasible. Radio, through broadcasting of news, music, and drama has the potential for such disruption, although the enemy regime may well be able to attract the audience with television. In any event, the "economics of attention" would call for a detailed analysis of how different population subgroups in the denied area spend their time, and of the regime's media programming to reach those population subgroups.

PSYOP, then, provides alternative media to effectively compete for the attention of target audiences. If political indoctrination and official news are broadcast to farmers at 5:30 A.M., PSYOP provides news and a "farmer's almanac of the air" type of program as an alternative. PSYOP provides domestic drama ("soap-opera") for the housewife during the day, popular music, and sports programs at selected times, perhaps radio drama and current events programs in the evening. By truly effective programming, influence is gained over how the audience spends its time.

Listeners to an "alternative channel," which PSYOP represents, breaks the state's monopoly on mass media by that act. The state may respond in several ways; by jamming, by competing with the alternative channel, by urging people not to listen to the alternate channel, or even imposing penalties for listening. These kinds of responses, while they may be viewed

as routine in some cases, constitute a recognition that the PSYOP is a threat and likely to be taken seriously by some in their society.

PSYOP, through the "economics of attention," can insert "indicator generators" into programming. The "indicator generators" in this case are selected areas of program content or timing, designed to interfere in some way with either time organization or regulation of activities. If, for example, an alternative broadcast designed to attract listeners at the same time state radio presents news and indoctrination was followed by a scheduling change for the state program, it might be interpreted as a possible indicator that the PSYOP was being listened to at the expense of the state program. By scheduling the more popular kinds of programs at times which conflict with the time organization of activities (e.g., scheduling rebroadcasts of sports events late at night, so that many industrial workers do not get adequate sleep, or scheduling the rebroadcasts at times which might lead workers to malingering in order to stay home and listen), it might be possible to create an indicator in the form of increased absenteeism at factories, which might be reflected in press reports or public warnings via mass media to workers.

PSYOP might also include suggestions either designed to bring about increased use of resources (e.g., recommendation to paint over decorative metalwork on houses to prevent rust) or suggestions intended to stimulate controversy or demand for concessions. The increased use of resources might not necessarily be significant insofar as the actual resources are concerned, but if it is perceived by authorities as potentially affecting the behavior of large numbers of people, references to (and rebuttal of) the suggestion may appear in the media of the target country. Where content intended to stimulate controversy or demands for concessions from the regime are used, the indicators should be found in the mass media content of the target country.

Yardstick Indication. This is an aspect of the economics of attention which seeks to provoke or evoke changes in the content of the target country

mass media. An example of yardstick indication is the promotion of jazz by Radio Free Europe in broadcasts to Eastern Europe in the 1950's and 1960's. Because of its popular appeal, state efforts to prevent listening to jazz failed, and today Eastern European stations play what was once called "decadent western music." This is, of course, a long-term effect.

Perhaps a more immediate form of "yardstick indication" is the monitoring of target country news broadcasts to identify errors, misrepresentations, and deliberate omissions with regard to events outside the target country, with PSYOP following up quickly by correcting the errors, offering the "true story" in rebuttal to the misrepresentation, or reporting news in depth which the enemy regime seems determined to ignore or conceal. The PSYOP news program is made credible by supplying plausible detail, and perhaps citing other sources (such as the British Broadcasting Corporation) for independent verification of the stories. The intent here is to so threaten the credibility of the target regime's state controlled media that they will react by providing additional coverage, possibly changing their version to make it more credible. Such a reaction would provide an indication that the enemy propagandists believed that the PSYOP: 1) had an audience of significant size paying attention; and 2) that the PSYOP was credible, perhaps at least as credible as their own domestic broadcasts.

#### Print Media

Our concern here is with those forms of print media which can be distributed to large audiences in denied areas. As with broadcast media, the denied area problem is a formidable problem in assessing the extent to which audiences pay attention to print PSYOP. The print media with which PSYOP primarily is concerned are "fast" media, i.e., leaflets, magazines, and newssheets, although some uses of "slow" media, such as books may also be considered. Where leaflets, magazines, and newssheets are concerned, "indicator generators" may be inserted to provide feedback on audience attention.

Return Coupons. Leaflet stubs, coupons, or similar devices (or, simply instructions on how to obtain gifts or information) good for inexpensive but useful gifts may provide one kind of "indicator generator." The coupons would be redeemable by mail, subject to quantity restriction, from commercial firms or letter drops in third countries. Those persons responding could be tallied by sex, location, ethnicity (if apparent from name, location, or language in which the printed media (as coded on stub or coupon) was disseminated, and the area of interest implied by the coupon (e.g., health information for old persons; recipes for housewives; professional journal articles or paperback books for students and intellectuals) and the PSYOP item with which the coupon was associated. Those persons returning coupons could possibly be contacted later by mail, provided the contact does not pose the threat of undue risk to them. The purpose of the contact would be to elicit selected information related to the content of the PSYOP and to inquire whether other gifts were desired.

Novelty Items. A potential "indicator generator" for attachment to leaflets, magazines, or newsheets could be gummed labels (such as the "peace symbol"), the origin of which is not apparent, and which cannot practically be suppressed by the regime in the target country. The indicator of dissemination then might be the extent to which the labels begin turning up in public places, on school books, or in other places which can be observed by travelers, diplomats, and other intelligence sources. While this kind of indicator must be viewed with caution, it is a kind of "trace" which could be used to stimulate spontaneous, if harmless, jabs at the regime (e.g., pasting a symbol over the glass which covers public notices on bulletin boards) and signs of encouragement to resistance elements.

A related "indicator generator" might be not-so-innocent gummed labels designed to be used by those who wish to express strong antipathy to the regime, such as resistance elements. Dropped in quantity to resistance groups, the gummed labels (slogans, symbols, etc.) could be disseminated to a much larger audience.

Resistance elements could use "neutral" (i.e., having no political content) labels on envelopes mailed to a third country address to indicate that the media were received and understood. The labels could be coded to indicate specific items.

If the gummed labels were widely disseminated, and acquired great "nuisance value" to the regime, an additional indicator might result: the apparent level of effort expended by the regime in trying to suppress use of the labels and the severity of measures taken against individuals for possession and/or use of the labels. The level of effort and severity of penalties should be roughly commensurate with the magnitude of the problem, as perceived by the regime. The regime's measures would probably be promulgated in the form of warnings or didactic announcements in the enemy country's or occupied country's media, and these media should be monitored for such indicators.

Mini-press Releases. This kind of "indicator-generator" could be printed on leaflets, in magazines, or in newssheets. The "releases" could be of several kinds - first, actual reports of highly salient news events related to key concerns of the target audience. Phrasing or terminology could be so arranged as to make direct quotes recognizable, and media output monitored for such quotes in stories, editorials, and letters-to-the-editor. A second kind could be "quotable quotes" by literary or folk-hero sources, which are especially pertinent to a given issue of concern to the target audience. Again, the media of target groups could be monitored for use of the quotes. A third variation might be a slogan or analogy directly relevant to the cause of a particular minority group, resistance group, or rival elite in the target country. Again, media could be monitored for appearance of the slogan, analogy, or reasonable approximation.

Yardstick Indication. A useful indirect indicator of how large an audience is being reached and whether the PSYOP is being understood might be the extent to which the enemy regime feels obliged to answer questions indirectly raised by the PSYOP. It is well-documented that propagandists

of opposite sides tend to communicate with one another.<sup>80</sup> It is also well-known that international media enjoy varying degrees of credibility. For example, it is commonplace in Eastern Europe to cross-check news stories by listening to BBC.<sup>81</sup> If the domestic propaganda of a country is subject to constant reappraisals in the light of what PSYOP from outside is saying, then the audience attention and understanding of and credence in the PSYOP must be considerable.

The basic approach to yardstick indication is to constantly provide correct information in the face of the enemy regime's misinformation, and to provide a constant "yardstick" against which to measure the validity of their own propaganda. Their response to PSYOP's "yardstick indication" may be interpreted as a soft indicator of how well PSYOP is reaching significant audiences in the target country.

#### "Slow Media"

"Slow media," such as books, are of some concern to the present study; although books are typically not developed for purposes of PSYOP. From time to time, however, books do tend to have great impact (or potential impact) which is especially relevant to PSYOP. Examples are Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago and Dalton Trumbo's Johnny Got His Gun. Such books at given points in history may be capable of tremendous impact, but are not commonly used for PSYOP in denied areas. If they were deliberately introduced as PSYOP, various indicators such as references to the work in literary forums, the price of a copy on the black market, appearance of samizdat editions of the work or excerpts from it, or vigorous suppression of the book would constitute useful indicators of attention to and understanding of the book, the popularity of the book, and its perceived potential for subversion.

#### OTHER AUDIENCES

##### Homefront Population Subgroups

Within the homefront population, it is possible to delineate a large number of subgroups, depending on the PSYOP objective at hand. At a basic level we might speak of minority groups, resistance groups, rural and urban populations, students and intellectuals, and other population subgroups.

For most of these target audiences the indicators cited in the preceding section represent a limit on measures of communications efficiency that can probably be achieved without relying primarily on inferences from behavioral response to the PSYOP which is treated in the following chapter.

### Neutrals

In a sense it at first seems that PSYOP directed at populations of neutral nations falls outside the scope of this study. However, upon reflection, it is apparent that it is possible for a nation to be neutral in a given conflict and at the same time remain a denied area insofar as effects analysis is concerned. Even in the Western democracies which have been traditionally neutral nations (i.e., Sweden and Switzerland) it is no easy matter to carry out data collection for purposes of PSYOP effects analysis. For example, there may be compelling diplomatic reasons for not allowing survey research related to PSYOP in these countries.

This in itself does not make the neutral nation a denied area but it does diminish the degree of access effects analysis personnel have to the population. There are countries, particularly in the third world, which are neutral insofar as one conflict or another is concerned and which are at the same time denied areas to parties on one side or another of the conflict. An example might be Uganda or possibly Burma. We have a certain degree of access to each of these two countries and yet our access is quite limited because of the unique political characteristics of these countries.

In each case the neutrality of the nation gives us a certain advantage in data collection even though the area itself may be largely denied. For example, we can correspond with certain citizens in those countries without necessarily putting them under a cloud of suspicion and subjecting them to arbitrary arrest and detention or possibly even accusations of treason. It is possible to include tear-out questionnaires and coupons in magazines which we circulate with the permission of their government. Our broadcasts can urge them to write letters directly to the station and indicate their listening preferences as far as program content and broadcast times are concerned. The use of direct mail in those areas where population is reasonably literate offers considerable promise insofar as developing PSYOP

data is concerned. The emphasis here is on developing communications efficiency data in the form of subscriber lists which can be accomplished through offering free subscriptions to anyone who receives an initial copy of a publication through existing channels. Indicators of the comprehension and credence of the publication can be inferred from secondary requests (using pass-along coupons included in each copy) and ancillary publications advertised in the PSYOP magazine.

The objectives of PSYOP directed to neutral nations are generally two-fold--facilitative communication and developing public opinion favorable to U. S. political and military policies. These in turn have the potential to influence their government's policy of neutrality in some desired direction, toward either continuing neutrality or a shift in the direction of support for U. S. objectives.

Of course our interest will not always be in communicating with the general population. Our concern more typically is in communicating with influential or population groups which contain large numbers of "opinion-makers." This would include students, intellectuals, members of the ruling political party and members of the ruling elite. Here it may be desirable to limit the size of the audience which may be done by increased use of a direct mail approach and by use of a small subscriber questionnaire to collect basic demographic, socio-economic, and subscriber preference data.

### Elites

Elites represent a key target audience for PSYOP. There are numerous incidences on record of PSYOP programs being directed at political and military elites. The Zacharias broadcasts during World War II is one example.<sup>82</sup> A key part of the PSYOP strategy used against North Vietnam in 1972 was to attempt to establish communication with the Lao Dong party and the Politburo of North Vietnam by means of PSYOP.<sup>26</sup> This aspect of PSYOP will not be dealt with in this chapter since existing diplomatic intelligence and media analysis sources can answer most basic questions of communications efficiency.

generator" by disrupting normal activity cycles; 2) it can change the content of enemy media through a "yardstick indication" function<sup>34</sup> (the term "yardstick" here is borrowed from economics. By "yardstick indication," we refer to an attempt to influence enemy media programming by providing a "yardstick"-our own PSYOP media content. We may provide "better" entertainment; more credible information, and more interesting proposals for the enemy regime. To the extent that enemy media seeks to imitate our programming and furnishes more information in an effort to maintain credibility, we may regard our "yardstick indication" as successful),<sup>79</sup> provided the regime recognizes the need to do so; and 3) it provides a method of disrupting enemy time-organization through deliberately making passive entertainment available at times not convenient to the regime. Television would be the ideal medium for this, but television is a line-of-sight medium and might be infeasible. Radio, through broadcasting of news, music, and drama has the potential for such disruption, although the enemy regime may well be able to attract the audience with television. In any event, the "economics of attention" would call for a detailed analysis of how different population subgroups in the denied area spend their time, and of the regime's media programming to reach those population subgroups.

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## SUMMARY

Communications efficiency must be established before one may proceed to make inferences about "PSYOP effects."

Special use of the "indicator generator" concept is recommended, to create trace measures in different audiences, and to facilitate voluntary responses from selected audiences in a denied area. Some innovations in leaflet form and content are recommended, as well as broadcasts to provide "alternate agendas" for mass media attention. The deliberate popularization of songs and parody are suggested as tests of PSYOP media influence, as is the planting of specific information designed to produce a strong, positive reaction where motivation is already known to exist. Recommendations are also made regarding the use of third party organizations (i.e., in third countries).

## CHAPTER VI

### INDICATORS OF PSYOP EFFECTS

#### GENERAL

Previous chapters of this report have dealt with identifying the requirement in specific terms, developing a model for defining PSYOP objectives so that outcomes may be reasonably projected, reviewing existing approaches to effects analysis, and development of indicator concepts at the level of communications efficiency. In this chapter, our concern will be indicators of effects -- that is, those changes in attitude, values, behavior and information levels which are associated with psychological operations.

At this point, a strong caveat must be recognized. The state-of-the-art is such that it is unlikely that precise and reliable indicators of PSYOP effects can be developed except with regard to specific kinds of events. Further, there is an influential body of opinion in communications research which rejects any conception that construes media experiences as alone sufficient for a wide variety of effects.<sup>3</sup> This body of opinion is described by its "functional orientation" which uses the audience as interacting with media rather than being passively affected by it.

Thus any attempts to make inferences regarding media effects in denied areas must be couched in a recognition that: 1) such inferences regarding mass media effects on audiences now in denied areas is handicapped by an inadequate body of research; and 2) our lack of access to target audiences in their natural state in denied areas makes it impossible to directly observe or indirectly measure the mediating processes and variables which have a definite bearing on effects. In view of these caveats, the fragmentary nature of available evidence invariably leads to the conclusion that any inferences made are likely to be "soft inferences," which will be strengthened only as we learn more about the processes which are involved in producing the observed "effects."

In the previous chapter, our concern was primarily with indicators of communications efficiency. Many will argue that this is the most we can aspire to given our present level of knowledge. Up to this point, our approach has been primarily to introduce content or form into the message or presentation of media and monitor events in and around the denied area for traces apparently produced by the deliberate insertion of "indicator generators" into the communications content. This is clearly inadequate at the level of effects indicators except to establish a necessary condition for the effect. To these reservations must be added the problem of confounding of effects over a longer period, so that it becomes extremely difficult to identify and assess long-term effect as other influences come into play.<sup>3</sup>

For these reasons, the indicators which are about to be presented must be viewed with great caution. They are necessarily imperfect and crude, and, while they do not seek to address the question of mediating processes (e.g., group affiliation, self-selection of exposure, perception and interpretation of issues, predispositions, etc.), they do represent a list of suggestions which may be kept in mind for such indicators as the state-of-the-art improves, and they become more feasible. The order of presentation consists basically of categories of effect -- broadly termed levels of information, attitude and opinion measure, values, and behavior.

No attempt is made to treat print and broadcast media separately (as was done in the previous chapter) because, when dealing with the level of effects as opposed to communications efficiency, concern is with states of events independent of considerations of media. If we can determine that a change in values has been brought about in the target audience, it matters little to us from the standpoint of effects analysis whether it was brought about by means of leaflets, newsheets or radio broadcasts or a combination of all of these in conjunction with other influences from an operational standpoint. Questions relating to differential effects of media are, of course, important from the aspect of resource allocation, but these represent a larger question than the one with which we are concerned here.

Because the relative availability of indicators and feasibility of different data collection procedures will vary depending on the proximity of the target audience to those conducting effects analysis, four basic distinctions will be made with regard to target audience. Within each category of effects, these target audiences to be addressed are front-line troops, homefront audiences, neutral audiences and enemy elites.

#### INFORMATION LEVELS

Since PSYOP has as a major objective the presentation of U. S. and allied policies and aims to the target audience, an important effect to monitor is the level of information regarding particular subject matter among members of the target audience exposed to PSYOP and among numbers not exposed to PSYOP. Experimental research has yielded the observation that increased information is one of the most common effects of exposure to mass media.<sup>34</sup> Of course, within the experimental context, the self-selection variable is presumably randomized as part of the design. In non-experimental research such control over what may be a host of self-selection variables is usually not feasible, and therefore the question of self-selection of exposure remains unanswered. The implication of this is that "effects" such as level of information cannot be strictly attributed to exposure to PSYOP, since those already possessing a high level of interest and information about the subject matter of the PSYOP may be more likely to pay attention to the PSYOP. Bearing this limitation in mind, let us proceed to examine candidate indicators for level of information.

#### Audience: Frontline Troops

There are at least three basic approaches which can be used to make inferences regarding the level of information which enemy frontline troops acquire as a function of PSYOP: interrogation/interview; inferences drawn from behavior; and changes in the information level of similar audiences to which access is possible. However, the interpretation of different information levels must take into account possible sources of information other than PSYOP, including the enemy's own troop indoctrination and education programs ("know your enemy" type efforts) and prior education and predispositions of enemy soldiers exposed to the PSYOP.

Indicators Dependent on Interrogation or Interview Techniques. Since prisoners and defectors normally are available from this target audience, an opportunity to utilize interview methods and paper-and-pencil tests in development of indicators of level of information is thus provided.

Structured test responses. Assuming that an audience is literate, the extent to which a PSYOP program succeeds in conveying information which is understood and believed by the target audience may be crudely measured by self-administered questionnaires containing specific items related to PSYOP content. The completed questionnaires may be graded by content area or a composite score developed. Specific content of the questionnaire would be determined by the PSYOP campaign in question and administered to those prisoners or defectors who have a strong likelihood of having seen or heard the PSYOP in question.

Responses to structured interviews. These interviews would be concerned with specific points of information which PSYOP has tried to disseminate to enemy troops via specific media. The interview content might take the form of standard factual questions or such recall-dependent techniques as sentence completion tests or less directive approaches such as Thematic Apperception Tests (TAT). The content to be addressed by these interview techniques will have to be arrived at selectively, since the range of PSYOP appeal and information programs may be quite large. An example of the kind of content which might be given high priority in this type of interview would be information about the Chieu Hoi Program among Viet Cong prisoners captured during the Vietnam conflict. An illustration of the structured interview approach might be the use of such items as: 1) do you know what the Chieu Hoi Program is (if yes, probe for details to indicate extent of knowledge); 2) what is the Government's policy regarding the treatment of ralliers under the program; and 3) does the Government provide any kind of monetary payment to the ralliers (if yes, ask what the payments are in return for, and, if possible, approximate amount of payments for such things as bringing in weapons and equipment and any other services covered under the rewards program). The same kind of content might also be addressed by such tests as sentence completion, e.g., "the Government gives money to the ralliers if they...."

The use of Thematic Apperception Tests to gain indicators of information imparted by PSYOP might take the form of showing a series of pictures of the progress of a rallyer from the initial exposure to a leaflet through the actual process of rallying and processing at the Chieu Hoi Center, while asking the prisoner to describe in detail what is happening in each picture. The interviewer gives direction to responses by calling attention to subject areas but does not coach the respondent in his comments about pictures (except perhaps to probe for elaboration or clarification of statements made by the respondent). It seems feasible to use the TAT in interviews conducted by PSYOP personnel (not necessarily persons with formal training in the social sciences) who have received a certain amount of supplemental training.

Another kind of interview, which is somewhat less structured, is the focused interview, described by Merton (1946)<sup>83</sup> as having the following characteristics: 1) persons interviewed are known to have been involved in a particular concrete situation -- they have seen a film; heard a radio program; read a pamphlet, article or book; or have participated in a psychological experiment or in an uncontrolled but observed social situation (in the case of PSYOP effects analysis, the situation involves enemy soldiers being exposed to psychological operations media); 2) the hypothetically significant elements, patterns and total structure of this situation have been previously analyzed by the investigator - this analysis should produce a set of hypotheses concerning the meaning and effects of determinate aspects of the situation (in PSYOP the hypotheses would relate to information levels as a function of PSYOP exposure); 3) on the basis of this analysis, the investigator has fashioned an interview guide setting forth the major areas of inquiry and the hypotheses which locate the pertinence of data to be obtained in the interview - the PSYOP effects interview will include areas of inquiry dictated by the PSYOP information objectives; and 4) the interview itself is focused on the subjective experiences of persons exposed to the pre-analyzed situation (of particular interest to PSYOP is the information recalled by persons exposed - what they understand the information to mean and whether or not the information is believed).

The kinds of indicators embodied in the approaches described above have as a major purpose the identification of specific kinds of information possessed by the prisoners and defectors interviewed. In trying to establish the possibility of a causal relationship with PSYOP exposure, an attempt is made to ascertain whether the individual prisoner or defector was actually exposed to the PSYOP by means of one of the techniques described in the previous chapter. Data which can be aggregated on the basis of these interviews and analyzed statistically in a search for systematic differences in informational levels possessed by groups might include military units having probably experienced high exposure to PSYOP versus military unit having experienced relatively low exposure; area in which captured; time of capture (month, etc.); capture-surrender types (defectors, active surrender, passive capture, capture while resisting); and kinds of PSYOP or specific PSYOP items to which the individual was exposed.

Another class of indicators is behavior which tells us an individual possesses the information necessary to make correct assumptions regarding particular courses of action. For example, a Viet Cong attempting to rally should ideally follow certain procedures in order to be recognized as a rallier while defecting (i.e., a leaflet on the Chieu Hoi Program provided specific instructions on how to hold one's weapon to signal intent to rally). Other indicators can be developed along these lines for specific information which PSYOP campaigns seek to impart.

Effects of Information Level Among Similar Audiences. In a counter-insurgency situation or in a military situation where parties to the conflict are from a divided country (e.g., North and South Korea), persons on each side may pay attention to the same PSYOP. For example, broadcasts which are intended to enhance the image of indigenous government forces may be listened to not only by the insurgents and local civilians, but also by the indigenous government troops themselves. Similarly, government troops may be exposed to leaflets dropped in support of their operations when moving into new positions. This presents an opportunity to conduct interviews with members of government forces in a situation less artificial than that normally encountered in a pretest.

In addition, the government troops provide potential research subjects in an experimental dissemination of new programs directed at enemy forces. When the broadcasts are originated locally and under controlled conditions so that comparable troop units in an area selected for a comparison are not exposed, such an arrangement can provide a quick basis for assessing the relative impact of the broadcast on information levels among troops who have been in combat for a given time period (and who suffer from the usual discomforts, deprivations and limited access to information experienced by combat troops). This approach would also have the advantage over pretests of identifying reasons why particular broadcasts are not listened to (e.g., preference for other stations broadcasting at the same time, inappropriate timing of the broadcasts so that the press of military duties makes it impossible to listen, the effect of battle conditions on attention span, program content somehow offensive or depressing to frontline troops, etc.).

#### Local Populations

Generally the same kinds of approaches applicable to frontline troops are applicable to local populations in an insurgency situation. Interviews can be conducted to assess information levels relative to PSYOP exposure. Observation of behavior can yield inferences about possession of information which PSYOP seeks to disseminate and understanding of that information (i.e., as evidenced by correct assumptions about such programs as the volunteer informant program, or the movement by a population to a designated area as prescribed in PSYOP announcements). Where direct access to the local populace in the contested area is not feasible, it is possible to use civilians living in an area near the contested area to obtain assessments of the effect of PSYOP on information level in much the same way as government troops were used as subjects to assess the extent to which PSYOP campaigns or programs were likely to influence information levels among enemy troops.

### Homefront Audiences

The enemy's homefront population represents an extremely difficult audience from which to obtain any indicators of PSYOP effects on information level. The approaches which can be used are limited by the denied area problem which dictates that, realistically, few if any prisoners or defectors are likely to be obtained from a denied area except as a function of capture of specific territories. In terms of concrete cases, World War II saw frequent changes in battle lines and control of territories by both sides, as did the Korean conflict. However, Vietnam was considerably different at least as far as North Vietnam was concerned. Since actual invasion of North Vietnam by U. S. forces was an extremely remote possibility, the denied area problem was permanent. Therefore, interview approaches were not feasible while the denied area problem persisted.

Inferences from behavior are somewhat more feasible, although opportunities to observe behavior may be limited. In most cases, the behavior which yields inferences that the information content of the PSYOP was heard or read, understood, and believed are usually the same indicators which would permit inferences that the PSYOP achieved its desired behavioral effect. Although the use of similar populations in accessible areas may be feasible in some cases, it will probably not be feasible in most instances.

A possible indicator of the receipt and understanding of information in the denied area by homefront population groups might be the use of that information by these groups. This information might be used in public form, such as debates in the press, in privately sponsored, perhaps even covert, media of these groups. For example, an indication of the perceived information value of a given PSYOP message might be its publication in a samizdat form by an underground group or by students and intellectuals. Information supplied by PSYOP might be used in dissenting editorials and newspapers controlled by factions of the ruling party, in arguments for a particular viewpoint in letters to the editor or in pamphlets distributed in the denied area.

Audience: Neutrals

In cases where neutral nations represent denied areas, several groups of indicators may be used to assess the level of information imparted to target audiences in the neutral area by PSYOP. Several kinds of surveys, originating from a third country or from a cooperating diplomatic mission in the third country may be conducted. Media analysis (either analysis of the target country's media or analysis of third country media output about the target country) and surveys of populations adjacent to the target country may be other methods employed.

Surveys. As previously stated, conducting surveys in denied areas may be difficult though not always impossible. In the case of neutral nations, it may be possible to conduct surveys by using commercial organizations and selecting items carefully, although the problems of how to conceal the sponsorship of the survey may be a sensitive issue.

In countries with sufficiently wide-spread service, the survey could be conducted by telephone. This might also include telephone surveying from adjacent countries which are sympathetic to U. S. objectives. A mail-out survey could be conducted by commercial organizations or academic institutions in a third country, in the target country or by covert production and mailing of questionnaires to an identified sample of the target audience by the U. S. Embassy in the neutral country or by a friendly diplomatic mission. The questionnaires could be returned in postage-paid envelopes to a third country address. A major problem here (and this will very likely be a major problem no matter what the data collection technique for neutral countries) is that the content of U. S. PSYOP may be substantially duplicated in the local media either through wide-spread "cribbing" of U. S. publications or simply viewpoints shared by media staff members and U. S. leaders.

Media Analysis. In analyzing media from the target country or a third country, it will be necessary to make the analysis in an essentially qualitative sense, if we are looking for indicators of influence of PSYOP on the level of information. To make reasonable inferences, it would be

necessary not only to discern similar lines of argument in media output under study but also in related references to particular PSYOP broadcasts for publication.

Surveys of Adjacent Populations. Nations adjacent to one another may have a shared language and culture to the extent that access to one in terms of media preferences, interests, and the effect of PSYOP on information levels may be approximately equivalent to access to the population group across the border in the denied area. Where surveys are not feasible within the neutral nation but are feasible in the adjacent, similar nation, an opportunity to collect proxy measures may thus be realized.

#### Enemy Elites

There is little which can be developed (and is not already known) in the way of measures of information level and the influence of PSYOP upon these information levels where enemy elites are concerned. Projects such as DETAPS and day-to-day developmental work on the Foreign Media Analysis (FMA) system developed by the American Institutes for Research have explored this area in some depth, although the issue of the methodological feasibility of such measures is still being debated. Certainly the more traditional intelligence sources such as third country diplomatic personnel posted to the denied areas may be able to make observations of value to us in this regard. By their first-hand knowledge of and frequent contact with the elites to whom PSYOP is being addressed, the question of how much their information comes from our broadcasts to them and how much is gained from their own intelligence sources and from international media sources is and will probably remain an open question.

#### ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS

This report presents very little that is new with respect to attitude and opinion indicators of PSYOP effect in denied areas. Thus far unanswered methodological questions in this regard are enormous. In the absence

of survey data, one is forced to draw inferences from other kinds of data as they are available. These data tend to be primarily based on content analysis or inferences from behavior. Psychological warfare intelligence personnel were using such data as far back as World War II. Janowitz (1958) writes of the exploitation of diaries, captured mail, and captured enemy documents during this period.<sup>43</sup> The major problem with captured data is that it is not available systematically or in great quantity. The technique described in Chapter V of this report for generating large volumes of mail to prisoners-of-war might overcome part of this obstacle and provide a continuing source of content-analyzable material in quantities sufficient to permit systematic compilation of area-specific data on attitudes, opinions, values and behavior.

Since our primary concern is with immediate population effects, relatively little attention is given in this study to developing new indicators of attitude and opinion effects of PSYOP. This is not to minimize the importance of or the need for such indicators. Opinion polling was used extensively in Vietnam, owing to the nature of that conflict.<sup>29, 84, 85.</sup> Relatively little such opinion polling was conducted during the Korean conflict, although during World War II surveys were conducted in newly liberated areas of France and Italy.<sup>46</sup>

Public opinion surveys in denied areas are not feasible for a host of reasons which are well-known and will not be discussed here. Opinion or attitude surveys conducted in newly-liberated areas, among prisoner-of-war populations, and among populations with characteristics similar to those in denied areas each suffer from the same inherent limitation in that none of the samples drawn can be said to be representative of the populations which are still in the denied area. Two basic reasons for this are: 1) the selection variable which may be operative in determining who is physically present in an area under consolidation versus who is able to stay in the denied area or who is captured and who is not; and 2) the fact that the groups under our control and the groups in the denied area may be subject to different sets of stresses and expectations insofar as their present attitudes and behavior are concerned. Retrospective approaches to opinion

surveying among persons who have come out of denied areas suffers from the uncertainty which handicaps all retrospective studies - selective recall and erroneous recall where the kinds of indicators which would be used in such surveys are concerned (i.e., highly subjective matter such as how the respondent felt about a given issue and where his position on a scale might be).

Until these methodological questions can be better answered, the most promising approaches to study of opinions and attitudes in denied areas must be content analysis of mass media output from the denied area, content analysis of available documents such as captured mail and diaries (which are subject to the same criticism of irregular and therefore non-systematic access) and inferences from observed or reported behavior. With respect to different target audiences, the kinds of indicators sought from these three sources are going to depend very much on the PSYOP objectives and the situation in which the PSYOP is carried out.

The content analysis approach is applicable to the situation in which there is a controlled central press or in which access to regional or local newspapers and broadcasts in a denied area is feasible. It may be possible to develop systematic information through the FMA system for analysis of opinions and attitude of the elites who control the media. Where content analysis of mail is concerned, it may be possible using the approach cited in Chapter IV of this report to stimulate large volumes of mail from the homefront population to the prisoners-of-war from that area and by systematic content analysis to make inferences regarding opinions and attitudes of the homefront population.

In either of these content analysis approaches, a degree of caution must be used. Specifically, one must recognize that opinion change or attitude change which can be detected through systematic content analysis does not necessarily follow from PSYOP, which is intended to accomplish that change. This point does not need elaboration since it has been made before in this report. Where content analysis of mail to prisoners-of-war is concerned, there is always the risk that persons aware of the censorship of out-going mail will avoid the discussion of certain topics and therefore

limit the usefulness of that mail to content analysis. There is also the remote probability that the enemy regime may attempt to tamper with prisoner mail to plant misleading information, if they are aware (as they very likely will be) that it is being subjected to content analysis. The same caution must be used in content analysis of prisoner mail as is used in content analysis of media output.

#### VALUES

Changes in values represent an important potential objective for PSYOP. Riley and Cottrell (1957) have suggested that a key measure of the effectiveness of psychological warfare might be the extent to which it brings about changes in values.<sup>30</sup> As in the case of changing attitudes or opinions, both a pre-measure and a post-measure are needed to assess such changes (ideally, a control group should also be available, but in denied areas even a pre-measure may be asking too much).

Rokeach (1968) defines both attitude and value in terms of beliefs.<sup>86</sup> Specifically, an attitude is a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation, predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner. Values are types of beliefs, "centrally located within one's total belief system, about how one ought or ought not to behave, or about some end state of existence worth or not worth attaining." Opinions are defined as simply verbal expressions of beliefs, attitudes, or values. Thus, Rokeach would say that opinions are indicators of beliefs, attitudes, or values, provided you know which opinions express what beliefs, attitudes, or values.

Of the two concepts, attitudes or values, it would seem that values are the more shared or universal belief-systems in a given society. Values also seem to be a vulnerable area because conflicting values are often simultaneously held by societies and their members. For example, in American society, we simultaneously hold the values of competition and cooperation, self-reliance and charity, peace and confrontation ("the best defense is a good offense"), thrift and conspicuous consumption, justice and mercy, to cite a few. The values do not conflict so long as they are "in balance," and

consensus exists as to the relative appropriateness of this balance. An important part of introducing new definitions of the situation is to disturb this balance or the perceived relationships of existing circumstances to this balance. Thus, a government, which must at once be both oppressive and beneficent, could either be said to have: 1) changed so that it is more oppressive; or 2) not changed, although the consensus has become that it should be more beneficent. In PSYOP, either kind of shift in beliefs might be desirable, depending on our objectives and the enemy regime's vulnerabilities. To create a climate of opinion in the enemy country which would support negotiation of an end to the conflict, for example, we would be less interested in changing the regime's image (which might only result in a demand for new leaders) than in changing selected values among the general populace, such that demand for changes in the regime's war aims might be brought about.

Several methods exist for the assessment of values. Qualitative content analysis approaches have been employed to infer values from themes in popular fiction.<sup>87</sup> Rokeach has classified values into two distinct categories - means (how one should go about pursuing a particular goal) and ends (goals which should be pursued or avoided). To measure the relative strength of values, he developed two separate ranking scales, one to obtain rank orderings of each of the two types of values.<sup>86</sup>

The ECHO Method for the study of values is an approach which involves giving respondents self-administered questionnaires with opened-ended questions which permit free-response analysis (that is, analysis of responses which are not guided by forced choice among prepared responses). The analysis of long questionnaire responses is made feasible by standardized categories for classification of responses and computer programs designed especially for such analysis.<sup>88</sup> The ECHO Method has been tested cross-culturally and has been found to have acceptable reliability.<sup>89</sup>

Unlike ECHO, Rokeach's method involves forced choices among response alternatives. Rokeach does not deal with negative values in his prepared choices. For example, he offers the choice "equality" (brotherhood and

equal opportunity for all) without the alternative of "inequality," which has been a central value of entire cultures and persists in both traditional and industrial societies today.

Where a constant flow of persons from the denied area exists, as in refugee and prisoner-of-war populations, some variation of Rokeach's scales, or perhaps the ECHO Method, might be used, with computer-assisted analysis, and response distributions monitored over time and related, if possible, to specific PSYOP strategic campaigns. Here, criteria of "reasonable inference" and audience exposure would have to be used.

It is conceivable that a content analysis approach might be applied to the Foreign Media Analysis file. Symbol counts or theme counts might be used to infer prominent values, although the problem of controlled media may introduce obstacles to free expression of popular values. Still, where local autonomy exists in media, this is a question which might be explored, subject to the caveats previously expressed with regard to "reasonable inferences."

#### BEHAVIOR

While attitudes and opinions can be inferred from behavior, the objective of a great deal of PSYOP is simply to evoke some behavioral response, (i.e., when civilians are warned to stay away from military targets, to stay off the road or to evacuate a particular area when a battle is imminent). Morris (1969) cited the use of an observation helicopter to monitor behavioral response to such warnings in Vietnam.<sup>37</sup> This was a more simple and straightforward case in which direct observation was probable. As one gets further into a denied area, it may be feasible to develop other forms of behavior observation or to develop trace measures of behavior.

There are large numbers of people whom PSYOP intelligence personnel will never have an opportunity to interrogate, let alone observe directly, but who may very well be responding to PSYOP appeals. It will not be necessary to consider the type of media used since our concern is primarily with the response. However, it is desirable to know whether the areas in which the observation takes place were exposed to PSYOP. Since the response may result from other factors, it might be possible to use some of the indicators

of attention described in Chapter V of this report in order to assess the likelihood that observed effects are in fact PSYOP effects. Comparable areas exist which have not been exposed to PSYOP and which will permit a meaningful treatment/no-treatment comparison. This would considerably enhance the value of observations of behavior.

Audience: Frontline Troops

We have used the term behavior here rather than responsive physical action because the latter term involves an assumption that the observed behavior was in response to PSYOP. While there will certainly be cases where the only reasonable inference is one of PSYOP effects, there will be other situations in which several possible explanations exist for the observed behavior. It is the effects analysis task to try to determine which of the alternative explanations is most plausible. Most of the behavioral responses sought from frontline troops will be in the nature of defection or surrender, or such subversive activities as malingering. The usual indicators involving interrogation of prisoners and analysis of captured documents will be available in many cases; however, obtrusive observation may be used to monitor such indicators as in the following discussion.

A great deal has been written about prisoners-of-war as intelligence sources for PSYOP. For the most part, these writings have concentrated on interrogation as a means of eliciting information. Relatively little has been written on analysis of behavior residuals among prisoners, casualties, or simply "those that got away."

When we ask what kinds of behavior PSYOP seeks to bring about and get the obvious surrender and defection replies, we are led to the question of whether PSYOP might reasonably be expected to do anything else along these lines which would contribute to realization of our objective on the battlefield. The answer may well be "no, nothing you can detect" but it might be worth exploring. Take for example the enemy casualties immediately after a battle. We know from experience that there will be prisoners taken who have PSYOP leaflets on their person. Bruntz (1938) wrote of German troops who surrendered with "well-thumbed copies" of Allied propaganda books in

their possession.<sup>1</sup> An indicator reported by Morris was the number of prisoners having leaflets in their possession at the time of surrender.<sup>37</sup>

Of course, enemy dead and wounded will be searched to ascertain whether they have any documents in their possession which might be of intelligence value. Some of these will also very likely have PSYOP materials in their possession. It would be interesting to tabulate some of the behavioral characteristics of these men during the battle in which they lost their lives. Do they fight less aggressively than those who do not have PSYOP material in their possession? Some simple indicators might be: 1) their relative position during the fire-fight, were they killed close to the line of contact or were they tending to stay to the rear? 2) did they have more unexpended ammunition in their possession than those who did not possess PSYOP material? 3) what about possession of unmailed letters or mementos such as family photographs, might those with attitudes conducive to surrender consciously prepare themselves for periods of separation from their loved ones? What we are basically looking for here is indication of propensity to fight less well or less aggressively and evidence of preparation for surrender.

We might also want to determine whether newly issued medicines (e.g., aspirin)-possible indicators of having been on sick call recently-tended to be more frequently in the possession of those carrying PSYOP material than those not carrying PSYOP material. While the behavior traces we are speculating about may simply tell us about predispositions rather than PSYOP effects, it still offers an interesting area for exploratory study at some future date.

#### Target Audience: Local Populations

In an insurgency situation, we would want to be alert for possible responsive action on the part of local civilians to our PSYOP. Although existing approaches would, of course, be of interest, it might be possible to develop additional indicators based on the behavior residual concept discussed above.

#### Target Audience: Homefront Populations

Where PSYOP attempts to elicit immediate courses of action on the part of the civilian population, there are several ways in which compliance with the suggestions or directions in the PSYOP might be monitored. First, there is direct observation. How this will be done is a decision made by those controlling the assets. However, it is suggested that with the availability of high altitude reconnaissance flights or reconnaissance satellite photography having reasonably good resolution, it would be possible to periodically sample geographic areas to which our PSYOP is directed and compare the observed activity patterns with a comparable area to which PSYOP was not directed.

A handy example of how aerial observation could have been used in Vietnam to monitor effects of strategic PSYOP may be seen in our attempts to keep farmers from working collective plots in favor of their own private plots. The vulnerability was identified through articles in Hanoi newspapers which complained of farmers neglecting their obligations to work on collective plots and instead concentrating on tilling the private plots which they were allowed to retain. The impetus to this behavior was assumed to be fear of food shortages, a theme which our radio broadcasts stressed.<sup>26</sup> Since it is easier to control the spread of leaflets than reception of radio signals, the warnings of an imminent food shortage could have been spread in selected districts in North Vietnam while districts selected for comparison would have the leaflet drops withheld. Aerial reconnaissance could then photograph the areas at selected times of the day (e.g., 8 A.M., 12 noon, 4 P.M.) and compare the numbers of people working the collective plots in areas exposed to PSYOP versus areas not exposed to PSYOP, plus the presence or absence of such possible signs of coercion as military trucks or armed guards.

It hardly needs to be said that interpretations such as these must proceed cautiously. Still, careful coordination of PSYOP and subsequent observation, especially when observation can be carried out before and after, as well as in control and treatment areas, may be most promising.

Another indicator which could be observed through aerial photography might be numbers of people on the roads at particular times of the day (areas in which people have been warned of possible bombing attacks could be

checked to see whether people were avoiding areas which might be considered military targets or whether people tended not to travel immediately after the warnings). Additional indicators of this type could be developed to fit the objective.

#### Target Audience: Neutrals

Since our major concern with PSYOP directed to neutral populations is to obtain and keep their support, there would be relatively little occasion to elicit direct behavioral response not related to general campaigns of persuasion. Therefore, this aspect of indicator development is not addressed here.

#### OTHER INDICATORS

Additional kinds of behavior traces might be picked up if it were possible to monitor market characteristics of a given area either through covert intelligence sources or through monitoring news media. If warnings of food shortages brought on hoarding, it seems likely that there would certainly be reactions in the market place (of unexpected drain on supplies, need for reordering more frequently, upward pressures on prices or, at least on the black market, price of key goods such as salt and grain). It also seems likely that the news media would be used to attempt to bring the hoarding under control. Indications of more frequent arrests and public punishment of black marketeers and other "economic criminals" might be expected if the response to "scarcity PSYOP" begins to threaten the local government's ability to maintain equilibrium in its marketplace. Additional kinds of indicators can be developed along similar lines, with these offered merely as examples.

#### SUMMARY

After communications efficiency has been established, our next level of concern is with actual PSYOP effects. Categories of effects are: 1) information; 2) attitudes and opinions; 3) values; and 4) behavioral response. Where information levels are concerned, various interview and verbal test approaches are suggested, although it is recognized that severe limitations obtain here. Attitude and opinion measures are more elusive, and relatively

little in the way of new indicators is recommended. Where values are concerned, some long-term studies might be considered, using variants of the Rokeach ranking approach, or the ECHO Method on new prisoners-of-war, recent refugees, or other groups at different times. Content analysis approaches might also be tried on an exploratory basis. Observation of behavior is limited by denied area restrictions, but indicators might be developed along the lines of "behavior residuals" and innovative approaches to aerial photography.

## CHAPTER VII

### BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE

#### PROSPECTS FOR EFFECTS ANALYSIS

Given the state-of-the-art where mass media effects analysis are concerned, the logical problems of relating observed effects to media stimuli and all of the other limitations which were presented in Chapter I, any proposals for effects analysis techniques which do not rely on interrogation or survey data, or direct observation of short-term responsive action must seem somewhat futuristic. One reason in particular that this must be so is the lack of assets presently available to psychological operations and related research and development. A second major reason is that clearly any new approaches will not be immediately testable. A third reason such innovations must seem futuristic is the fact that so much effects analysis in the past has been based on speculation and fragmentary data, and therefore systematic verification of PSYOP effects depends heavily on the development of new kinds of data and data collection procedures. While it is hoped that the techniques and indicators developed in this study are of immediate value to the Army, it is clear that a great deal of further developmental work and study are going to be necessary if we are to understand what effects psychological operations campaigns have on populations in different types of denied areas and how these effects are brought about.

As far as the state-of-the-art of PSYOP effects analysis is concerned, the greatest immediate promise for further development is in the area of determining audience size, characteristics of audience, and the extent to which PSYOP is understood and believed by the target audience. Our contention is that the understanding and belief of PSYOP is best reflected in the extent to which differences in information level and recall are observed in groups exposed to PSYOP and those not exposed. Effects which are intended to take place over the longer term might possibly be measured through techniques such as content analysis of media output or surveys of accessible populations, such as prisoners-of-war captured at various points during the conflict, but causal relationships between these intended or observed effects

and PSYOP is not likely to be demonstrable. Any inferences of causality must await the systematic formulation, testing and reformulation of propositions regarding the communication process which takes place between the PSYOP operator and the target population, until a reasonably coherent body of knowledge is developed about the process and effects as they operate in different contexts of military and political conflict.

#### KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Before research can proceed further toward developing better effects analysis techniques for denied areas, a kind of research agenda needs to be formulated and judgements made about their relative priority and the feasibility of research to answer key questions. A tentative list of questions and areas of research focus is presented below.

1. Audience. The "hypodermic effect" model which was employed prior to development of the "functional orientation" conceived of the audience as essentially a responsive rather than an interactive participant in the communications process. Audience analysis must take into account not only the demographics and political inclinations of the target audiences, but must also attempt to account for their attention or lack of attention and response or lack of response to particular PSYOP communication in terms of: 1) patterns of selective attention or avoidance; and 2) meaning of PSYOP messages in cultural political, and action implication terms.

2. Cultural and situational constraints on response for various audiences and the institutional context in which responses, either active or passive, take place.

3. Channels through which various audiences may respond. Given the institutions of the target society, what kinds of opportunities exist for expression? What are the modalities of information exchange within the society (both in terms of channel and content) and how do these relate to mechanisms of control?

4. What is the function of our PSYOP in the social structure of the target society? If particular functions for PSYOP exist, what are the potential functions of PSYOP for the target audience? This will relate back to the question of what PSYOP should endeavor to accomplish and how the

PSYOP source and media are perceived by members of the target audience. This question of function should be viewed as dynamic, since the PSYOP function may change with the situation in the target country and the stage of the conflict.

5. Organization of activity and time allocation relative to PSYOP opportunities. Through better understanding of the relative availability of time for activities, an "economics of attention" strategy should be able to effectively compete with the target regime in directing the ways in which the time is spent; however, first a detailed analysis of such time allocation will be required.

6. Assessment of what is "normal" activity in different target groups and what is observable. For example, a particular audience might be typed in terms of time allocation (as suggested in recommendation 5), social organization, and spatial activity patterns. What is the "normal" distribution of people in a given village at 2100 hours, or as expressed by the mother of a POW as she writes a letter to her son? A great deal of information might be obtained through analysis of observation data, content analysis, and other techniques once such "normal" patterns are identified and made part of a PSYOP intelligence system (such as PFADS or PFAS).

7. What are the differential effects of high involvement versus low involvement content and media, in terms of learning and subsequent action? How does this affect: 1) the learning and retention of PSYOP information "traces"; 2) understanding of the PSYOP; and 3) belief of messages?

8. Differential effects of various modes of presentation (e.g., one-sided vs. two-sided). A great deal of work has been done in this area, but more cross-cultural study is needed.

9. In connection with target analysis, it is important to learn as much as possible about the values of the audience, and to assess changes in these over time. Techniques of value analysis, using "most-like" populations, content analysis and ethnographic sources, would be valuable in developing a data base which can be used subsequently to assess changes in values. Observed value changes might then be examined in relation to PSYOP objectives and effort.

These are but a few of the key questions which must be addressed in such a research agenda. It is recommended that such an agenda be developed in the light of existing theory, known facts, and the present state of PSYOP effects analysis and social science methodology. Pursuit of such a systematic agenda will greatly improve the likelihood that a better set of PSYOP effects analysis indicators and methods can be developed in the future.

APPENDIX A

DEVELOPMENT OF PSYOP OBJECTIVES  
FROM NATIONAL OBJECTIVES:  
A CRITICAL EVALUATION AND CASE STUDY

By John T. Morgan, Jr.

## GENERAL PRINCIPLES

While established at all levels of command, PSYOP objectives are a poorly understood subject. Invalid or only partially valid objectives, and objectives not stated in a manner which facilitates their accomplishment and the measure or attainment of indicators of their accomplishment hamper the achievement of national and military objectives, and inhibit the attainment of indicators of effectiveness of the programs themselves.

In the proper establishment of objectives lies a fruitful field for improving the measurement or providing the indicators showing the effectiveness of PSYOP programs.

Strategy consists of four components, military, economic, political and psychological. In the conduct of war all must be applied and all must be mutually supporting. The overall national objectives must be supported by the objectives established for the components of strategy. If these later objectives are achieved they lead in turn to the achievement of the national objectives. If they aren't achieved, achievement of the national objectives becomes most difficult or impossible.

## ESTABLISHMENT OF PSYOP OBJECTIVES

When the national objectives have been established, the national planners establish the national PSYOP objectives. These objectives, which may be stated in such terms as "to destroy the will of the enemy forces and population to fight," or "to continue the war," or "to deny support to the leadership," etc., etc., must, if achieved, directly support the attainment of the national objectives. If they do not adequately address all applicable areas and directly support the national objectives, the PSYOP program will be ineffective, or as a minimum its effectiveness will be reduced.

National PSYOP objectives must be established at the outset which address the prosecution of the war to a successful conclusion. Additional objectives should be formulated which have time limitations for achievement and/or which address limited objectives. It is through these latter

that more specific and time-sensitive guidance can be provided. Their attainment or partial attainment also provides for periodic checks of effectiveness which are most difficult to measure periodically in the overall long-term objectives. These objectives when established are binding on all departments and agencies of the government.

As with national political, economic and psychological objectives, national military objectives supportive of the national objectives must be established. After their establishment the PSYOP planners in the Department of Defense establish appropriate PSYOP objectives which support the national, national military and national PSYOP objectives. As in the case of national PSYOP objectives, the objectives of the military or other departments or agencies housing elements under military control must be formulated as were the national PSYOP objectives (long-range, addressing the entire duration of the war, those with time limitations for achievement and also those providing more limited time-sensitive guidance). Where multi-U. S. departments or agencies are involved in an area of operation, much of the military PSYOP objective guidance may be provided in the form of national level or joint, coordinated multi-agency/department directives. When the theater commander has overall responsibility for the operation, objective guidance is passed through military channels to him. Other participating commands not subordinate to the theater commander may receive policy and objective guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by joint national directive or from the ambassador in a particular country.

As with the national PSYOP objectives the national military PSYOP objectives must meet the above specifications if the PSYOP program is to be effective and if indicators of effectiveness are to be provided.

To this point the discussion of the establishment of objectives appears simple, logical and uncomplicated. In actual practice during the Vietnam War this was not the case. Objectives which established the content of programs were limited, noncomprehensive and if achieved would have had a limited effect on the successful outcome of the war. It is for this reason that the discussion of objectives is so lengthy. If comprehensive, effective objectives are not established at all levels, the programs conducted will

have limited overall effectiveness. Any study dealing with the indicators of effectiveness of PSYOP must address the potential effectiveness of the objectives.

#### PRIORITY ON WEIGHTING THE EFFORT TO BE DEVOTED TO THE VARIOUS OBJECTIVES

It is normal that certain PSYOP objectives should have greater significance than others in the achievement of national objectives. It would be a rare circumstance when sufficient resources are available to provide adequate and equal resources in support of all objectives. During the Vietnam War it was only at the lower echelons that weighting was applied. Even at the lower echelons this weighting was frequently not applied or applied to a limited extent. As a consequence certain objectives were more heavily supported than others and reduced the effect of the overall programs. Weighting must be considered utilized if programs are to reflect the emphasis desired by the commanders.

An example is a study conducted in Vietnam in the late 1960s. At the time eight GVN national PSYOP objectives were supported by leaflet operations. There was no weight of effort prescribed for the support of these objectives, except that the MACV PSYOP staff element approved the number and type of U. S. leaflets to be printed. This was considered by the staff to be adequate weighting. The study covered two consecutive three-month periods and addressed both the reproduction and development efforts. It was found for the first three month period that no production effort was expended in support of three of the objectives. One percent of production effort was devoted to one additional objective. Six, eight, 12 and 73 percent was devoted to the additional four objectives. The following three month period represented improvement, two objectives zero production support, two objectives two percent support each. The remaining objectives received 9, 14, 20 and 53 percent production support. Development support was better balanced; however, one objective received no support and another less than 2 percent support for the six month period.

It is obvious that, insofar as the leaflet operations were concerned for this period, at least two objectives were unsupported, and any possible effectiveness in achieving these objectives was negated. Only through the

weighting of effort in support of objectives can an effective overall program be conducted. This weighting has not been a standard procedure at higher PSYOP staff levels. Weighting generally has been practiced by PSYOP units when they were given the latitude to establish it.

#### CASE STUDY OF ESTABLISHMENT OF PSYOP OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM

To illustrate the problem, let us consider a specific case involving the establishment of PSYOP objectives at a lower level. Appendix 2 (Guidelines for Psychological Operations) to Annex 0 (Political Warfare and Psychological Operations) to combined Campaign, 1970, AB 145;\* provided the basic PSYOP guidance for U. S., Vietnamese and Allied military forces in Vietnam for 1970.

This document stated three national objectives:

- (1) Build democracy in Vietnam;
- (2) Secure peace, independence and security for the Vietnamese people;
- (3) Support social reform throughout Vietnam.

No attempt will be made to provide an analysis of these national objectives; it is sufficient to state that in their inadequacy they reinforce the foregoing discussion on the establishment of objectives.

The psychological objectives stated in the plan, of which there are 15, are as follows:

- (a) To assist in the modernization and improvement of RVNAF;
- (b) To motivate a self-help and self-determination spirit among the Vietnamese people;
- (c) To support the pacification objectives;
- (d) To convince the Vietnamese populace that RVNAF forces are modern and effective forces capable of assuming an even greater responsibility for defending the Republic of Vietnam;

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\* Appendix referenced but not included in this study.

- (e) To generate disaffection, defection and the reduction of combat effectiveness of VC/NVA forces;
- (f) To exploit the psychological preparation to which the NVA units have been subjected during their infiltration into RVN;
- (g) To induce enemy forces and their supporters to rally to the just cause of the Government of Vietnam;
- (h) To help destroy both the NVN Armed Forces in RVN and the infrastructure of the VC/NLF by inducing large numbers of middle and higher level cadres to come over to the Government of Vietnam;
- (i) To promote the morale, loyalty and support of friendly civilian and military forces for the Government of the Republic of Vietnam;
- (j) To convince the people that their legitimate hopes and aspirations can be best fostered by the democratic process;
- (k) To drive a psychological wedge between the civilian population and the VC/NVA in order to deny the enemy the popular support essential to its survival;
- (l) To convince all Vietnamese people that the FWMAF are in Vietnam only to assist the Vietnamese people in defeating aggression and building an improved economy and that the FWMAF will be withdrawn once the aggression is defeated or FWMAF are no longer required;
- (m) To convince the Vietnamese people that the VC/NVA are being defeated;
- (n) To convince the people of Vietnam that the GVN is the rightful and just government and represents the National Cause;
- (o) To convince the people of Vietnam that through the GVN they will enjoy peace and security in a free society, under their own elected government, once the aggression is defeated.

At this point a few questions are in order:

- Is a weight of effort of priority assigned to the various objectives? No, therefore the national plan does not control the weight of effort to be applied, nor the resulting effect of this effort. The designation of PSYOP objectives that support a particular national objective does in a sense weight the PSYOP program;
- Do the PSYOP objectives provide for the prosecution of the war to a successful conclusion? No, recognizing that the NVA as well as the VC were heavily engaged during this time frame, the successful accomplishment of the PSYOP objectives would not have necessarily led to a successful conclusion of the war, PSYOP objectives (a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (g), (i), (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o) if successfully achieved would be of great assistance in maintaining GVN victory but not insure that victory. Objective (e) if changed to read, "To generate disaffection, defection and destroy the combat effectiveness of VC/NVA forces," could if accomplished result in eventual victory. So could Objective (h) if changed to read, "To destroy both the NVA Armed Forces in RVN and the infrastructure of the VC/NLF by inducing large numbers of middle and high level cadre to come over to the Government of Vietnam.";
- Do the objectives as stated provide for long, medium and short-range accomplishment or measurement?

<u>Long-Range</u>	<u>Medium-Range</u>	<u>Short-Range</u>
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)	(f)	(f)

Only PSYOP objective (f) can really be classified as a long, medium and short-range objective. This objective-to exploit the psychological preparation to which the NVA units have been subjected during their infiltration into RVN-is long-range in that new units are always being added. It is medium to short-range in that the exploitation must take place while the unit is infiltrating or shortly after arrival. The point of this discussion being that there are no intermediate yardsticks

which provide for measurement of accomplishment or effect or direction of effort;

- Do the objectives directly support the three stated national objectives?

<u>Objective (1)</u>	<u>Objective (2)</u>	<u>Objective (3)</u>	<u>Objective (x)</u>
Build democracy in Vietnam	Secure peace, independence and security for the Vietnamese people	Support social reform throughout Vietnam	
(j) (o)	(a) (c) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (k) (m) (n) (o)		(b) (d) (1)

PSYOP objectives (j) and (o) if successful will not build democracy in Vietnam, national objective (1). At best they can convince the people that their aspirations can be met by a democratic government. National objective (1) is not adequately supported. Many of the PSYOP objectives supporting national objective (2) can be placed in this category only due to implied nature of national objective; national objective (2) is poorly stated. There are no PSYOP objectives which fully support national objective (2); a reordering and re-statement of the PSYOP objectives is required. Three PSYOP objectives (b), (d) and (1) logically don't support any of the three stated national objectives.

The foregoing type of analysis, while subject to interpretation, can quickly determine if objectives are properly stated and the effort distributed properly. Improper statement can preclude the conduct of an effective PSYOP program and inhibit the measurement of programs that may be effective.

#### A FINAL POINT ON OBJECTIVES

The proper wording and time phasing of an objective can greatly facilitate the measurement of its accomplishment. As an example: PSYOP objective (e) to exploit the psychological preparation to which the NVA units have been subjected during their infiltration into RVN, could be rephrased as follows: "To lower the morale of NVA units and individual replacements during and shortly after their infiltration in the RVN by exploiting the inaccuracies of the favorable situation presented to them during their psychological preparation for and during their infiltration -- By:---." At this point a new type of objective (currently not being used) might be introduced, entitled "a means objective." Although the currently used term task could also be applied, the means objective would go beyond the scope of regular PSYOP objectives by providing guidance to commanders on implementation, as illustrated in the following steps:

- (1) Create casualties through air operations during the infiltration process;
- (2) Advise the infiltrators on the upper portions of the trails, by leaflet operations, of the hardships and dangers with which they will be confronted;
- (3) As infiltration progresses down the trails, advise them by leaflet of techniques for desertion, malingering, surrender and how to self-inflict wounds which would exclude them from the fighting;
- (4) As infiltration progresses further advise the infiltrators of the true situation they will be faced with after entering the RVN;
- (5) Destroy food storage depots on the trail to create shortages for the infiltrators.

With this type phasing of objectives it is possible to provide some indicators as to whether the primary objective, that of lowering morale, is being accomplished. The infliction of casualties can be determined by direct observation, aerial photography, prisoner interrogation, captured documents and possibly radio intercept and media analysis. Whether infiltrators are exposed to the PSYOP exploiting the second, third and fourth means objectives,

hardship and danger, and the true situation can be determined by prisoner interrogation. The fifth means objective can be measured as was the first.

The above doesn't necessarily answer the principal question "was morale lowered?" However, if the response to the means objectives is positive, and if the means objectives have been properly formulated it provides strong indicators that morale has been lowered, additional emphasis of course must be placed on answering the specific was morale lowered and to what degree.

Another example can be made of PSYOP objective (e), "To generate disaffection, defection and the reduction of combat effectiveness of VC/NVA forces." Providing indications, evidence or measurement of the accomplishment of this objective presents many difficulties. It can, however, possibly be simplified by first providing one objective addressing only VC and one for NVA forces. Now only addressing the VC objective it might be stated:

PSYOP Objective: To lower the morale of the VC by generating disaffection, malingering, defection, surrenders and by reducing their combat effectiveness.

Means Objective: (For brevity at this point only By priority defection will be addressed).

- (1) By leaflet and other means advise all VC within 25 km. of government controlled areas of the Chieu Hoi Program and how to return to the government under this program;
- (2) By leaflet, poster, direct contact and other means advise known dependents of VC who reside in government-controlled areas of the provisions of the Chieu Hoi program and how their relatives can be saved by the program;
- (3) etc., etc. - The next step could be a 50 km. zone of notification and so on.

The principle involved here is that by measuring the accomplishment of subcomponents of an objective, indicators are generated which reflect achievement trends of the principle objective.

A PROPOSED TAXONOMY  
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS  
OBJECTIVES

By Robert C. Sorensen

## OUTLINE OF PSYOPS OBJECTIVES

### INPUT OBJECTIVES

1. Clear knowledge of efficiency and effectiveness objectives.
2. Sufficient PSYOP manpower available in operation preparation and maintenance with respect to linguistics, message format and content, delivery technology, research.
3. Sufficient technology for origin and delivery of message, and adequate maintenance of same.
4. Sufficient supply of media and conveyance.
5. Communication contents meeting tests for clarity, interest, credibility, persuasion and ability to activate recipient in accordance with objectives.
6. Adequate means to monitor efficiency and effectiveness.
7. Backup of men and material reserves.

### OUTPUT OBJECTIVES

#### 1. Communications Efficiency

Audience Attention to Source of Message

Audience Attention to Message

Audience Accessibility to Message

Audience Receipt of Message

Audience Exposure to Contents of Message

Audience Comprehension and Perception of Message

Credibility of Source to Audience

Credibility of Message to Audience

#### 2. Awareness and Attitudinal Effectiveness

Audience Awareness of Source and/or Own Regime

Audience Attention to Source and/or to Own Regime

Diversion of Audience Attention from Source and/or from Regime

Audience Belief Source and/or Regime Behaves Consistent  
with what it Says

Audience Belief Source and/or Regime will Behave  
Consistent with what it Promises

Audience Belief in Selves

Audience Belief in Society

Audience Belief in Regime

Audience Belief in Future Selves

Audience Belief in Society's Future

Audience Belief in Regime's Future

3. Activated Behavioral Effectiveness

Audience Actions in Self Interest

Audience Actions Facilitating and Resisting Regime

Audience Actions Facilitating and Resisting Source

4. Outcomes

## INPUT OBJECTIVES

Input objectives are those preoperational requirements that must be met before mounting and fielding any PSYOP operation. They are often confused with purposes of an operation (e.g., our purpose is to drop 10,000 leaflets) or goals of an operation (e.g., we want to spread the word to every possible hamlet in the target area), when in fact they are only the means necessary to accomplish specific communications efficiency and behavioral effectiveness output objectives.

Input objectives are required in order to enforce predetermined accountability for the resources invested in a PSYOP operation and the manner of their use. How well objectives were accomplished, and why, can be effectively evaluated only when information is available about the requirements that were met for the operation and the results that were anticipated as a result of the investment of specific resources. In turn, this means that rational prediction of results must be made at the outset of the operation and that necessary quantity and quality of resources be invested to assure the greatest probability of achieving these results.

## OUTPUT OBJECTIVES

### DEFINITION OF TERMS

By source is meant the entity behind a given PSYOP operation. Ordinarily in this paper reference is obviously made to whatever United States military unit is responsible for carrying out the operation and in whose behalf the achievement of objectives is sought. Occasionally, however, sources will refer to another party (ally or intervening) carrying out a PSYOP operation.

By regime is meant the institutionalized leadership of the body of individuals we are seeking to influence and activate through a PSYOP operation. A government, a military command, the heads of a civilian organization: all may qualify.

By audience is meant the body of individuals who represent a PSYOP target for communications designed to achieve specific military and political objectives. Every audience is a target audience, i.e., a group to which communications are aimed regardless of the extent to which they receive the message. An audience does not exist unless it is addressed by a PSYOP effort; the fact that it seems to be a natural target because of the significance of its behavior to source's military effort is not relevant.

Members of a PSYOP target audience will sometimes include regime personnel.

## OUTPUT OBJECTIVES: COMMUNICATIONS EFFICIENCY

### AUDIENCE ATTENTION TO SOURCE OF MESSAGE

Extent to which a person is aware of his enemy and the specific message delivery source (existence, location, potential for message delivery, time of operation, manpower complement, degree of fortification).

Attention can be generated by individual's own perception of enemy activity, prior exposure to or new promise by delivery source, or alert from own government or military leadership.

Audience attention can be isolated in residue of own awareness and preoccupation (e.g., interviews, diaries, letters, conversations with others, other measured behavior) and extent of regime or leadership efforts to call attention (e.g., oral and hard copy mentions).

### AUDIENCE ATTENTION TO MESSAGE

The extent to which a person becomes aware of the message involves the following factors:

- The message's existence;
- The fact it has been sent;
- Method of dissemination;
- The fact it has been delivered;
- Incentive to read or hear or view;
- Incidence of message interference or interdiction by enemy sources;
- Competition for attention of other factors;
- Reaction to encouragement or discouragement for exposure from enemy sources;
- Incidence of message concealment by environmental factors.

#### AUDIENCE ACCESSIBILITY TO MESSAGE\*

The extent to which a person can make contact with the message is affected by such factors as:

- Target facility to receive (e.g., radio sets);
- Environmental factors (e.g., static, rain and snow, high winds);
- Enemy interference and sanctions against exposure;
- Enemy interdiction.

Input objectives concerned with message circulation are vital to the accomplishment of dissemination to all possible recipients, a prime determinant of accessibility. These requirements concern power output of transmitters, number of leaflets produced for manufacture, time and equipment utilized in seeding leaflets, etc.

#### AUDIENCE RECEIPT OF MESSAGE

Whether or not the message was delivered to or picked up by the intended recipient.

Except for direct observation or testimony concerning direct observation, evidence cannot be collected that receipt of the message occurred in and of itself unless the message is found in hard copy form on the person of the recipient.

Receipt of the message can be demonstrated inferentially only through memory residue (e.g., identification of some unique aspect of the message or the medium in which it appears).

#### AUDIENCE EXPOSURE TO CONTENTS OF MESSAGE

Whether or not the message information was read, heard, viewed or otherwise imparted to the intended recipient, once the message is received is affected by such factors as:

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\* At times, there may be confusion between which comes first: attention to message or accessibility to message. Generally attention is presumed to come first, because people may be informed of a message or at least of an act of the enemy's delivery system, yet be unable or forbidden to make contact with the message.

- Environmental interference factors;
- Regime interference factors;
- Necessary solitude or privacy afforded recipient;
- Literacy of recipient;
- Psyche of respondent (e.g., fear, interest, willingness to take risks).

#### AUDIENCE COMPREHENSION AND PERCEPTION OF MESSAGE

Is the message content understood? Does the recipient understand the contents to be what the senders intend to convey? To what extent is the fact of message receipt recalled?

#### CREDIBILITY OF SOURCE TO AUDIENCE

To be believed, a source is subject to the following audience judgments:

1. Are message recipients aware of the source's existence?
2. Is awareness of source existence prior to and independent of the message or its delivery mode?
3. What is the relationship of the recipient to the message source?
4. What do those elements influencing recipient attitude say about message source, and how credible are they?
5. Does compatibility exist between message source promise or information and what recipient has learned independently?
6. To what extent does message content affirm or deny source credibility?

#### CREDIBILITY OF MESSAGE TO AUDIENCE

To be believed, a message is subject to the following audience judgments:

1. The credibility of the source.
2. The credibility of the medium and/or mode of delivery.
3. Extent to which the contents of the message are compatible with intuition as well as present and past experiences of recipient.

4. Amount and type of leadership resistance to message access by local leadership.
5. Amount and type of leadership resistance to message contents.
6. What the message recipient wants to believe about the message.
7. The persuasive quality of regime leadership arguments against message contents.
8. Audience morale at time of message receipt.

## OUTPUT OBJECTIVES: AWARENESS AND ATTITUDINAL EFFECTIVENESS

Awareness and attitudes always exist on the part of the target audience with respect to something and someone. They are the inevitable precursors of behavior despite the fact that people will seem sometimes to respond instinctively to something that befalls them. But instincts are indigenous to the human structure; a person responding instinctively is reacting spontaneously rather than in response to attitude. Nor should intuitive behavior be confused for instinctive. Intuition is a blending or circumstance with conclusions drawn from past experience despite one's inability or lack of time to marshal and articulate hard evidence.

If attitudes determine audience behavior, they need to be influenced. Behavior is seldom born; it is a made activity that emerges as a result of changing content and levels of awareness and belief. Before a target audience member behaves consistent with source objectives, his attitude may undergo several changes in content and intensity.

Unfortunately the attitude is difficult if not impossible to define empirically. It is clearly at work, yet tends to be defined in the terms we use to measure it. Care must be taken that attitudinal objectives and the indicators of their achievement are not defined solely in terms of how attitudes are measured.

### AUDIENCE AWARENESS OF SOURCE AND/OR OWN REGIME

Awareness is a precondition to attitude only in the sense that one must be conscious of something before he can think or act with respect to it. Familiarity and understanding of the issue assures greater likelihood of the PSYOP communication, for if people have no grasp of the situation they are in or the identity of the forces both leading and opposing them, they may not readily respond to efforts to influence them. In some instances, top-of-the-mind awareness should be encouraged; other times we may want people to forget or disregard.

#### AUDIENCE ATTENTION TO SOURCE AND/OR REGIME

Awareness is not sufficient; a PSYOP message will also need to take advantage of and call audience attention to whatever attention is being paid to source and to regime. At least minimal audience attention to source is necessary to assure that any attention will be paid to the message.

#### DIVERSION OF ATTENTION FROM SOURCE AND/OR REGIME

Diversion of attention away from one principal is often counterpoint for attracting attention to another. No enemy soldier is going to forget his unit commander, but a PSYOP operation may want to minimize whatever identity the target audience feels for a unit commander who is urging his men not to surrender at the time when source is asking them to surrender.

#### AUDIENCE BELIEF SOURCE AND/OR REGIME BEHAVES CONSISTENT WITH WHAT IT SAYS

Compatibility in audience minds between what a message says and what the sender does is always put to the test by the audience. The regime will certainly encourage any such test in the event of any incompatibility between source's message and action. This is why regime attacks against source efforts must always be examined to learn if they reflect source efforts rather than to assume that such attacks represent some form of regime deference.

It is the message that the PSYOP operator is more likely to control than the behavior his message describes or implies. Accordingly, his message should not contain an implied prediction about behavior which he does not control.

Compatibility cannot always be pretested; accordingly the PSYOP effort that pretests very high may nonetheless be a catastrophe.

#### AUDIENCE BELIEF SOURCE AND/OR REGIME BEHAVES CONSISTENT WITH WHAT IT PROMISES

What is said concerning compatibility applies in this instance as well. Sometimes promises are assumed to be safe because they involve future conduct. But because people tend to act in accordance with their anticipation of outcomes, outcome credibility is vital to source and regime alike. Seldom can

strategic gain be accomplished by incompatibility between promise and the subsequent action which frequently connotes the moral obligation of "performance." Because audiences are aware of the faithless promises they have made to themselves, the suggestion of promise is itself a discount factor for them.

#### AUDIENCE BELIEF IN SELVES

Self esteem, self confidence, hope for escape from immediate exigencies and belief in one's ability to accomplish one's goals can be a vital guide to human behavior. Audience self evaluation can be influenced in several ways to the favor of source:

1. An audience can be encouraged to denigrate its self worth because of the losses its member's incur and should expect to incur.
2. An audience can be given goals in personal living, concessions source knows the regime will never make and patently unreal hopes for the future -- all of which clearly defy accomplishment to the individual and thereby seriously impair his morale.

Interestingly enough, the regime may want to engender a sense of worthlessness on the audience's part as well, depending on the nature of its goals. Under some circumstances, such feelings of worthlessness could be utilized against PSYOP source (e.g., hopelessness discouraging attention to and faith in source messages).

Note: Because the future blends so much with the present, the items dealing with future selves, society's future, and regime future will not be separately treated herein.

#### AUDIENCE BELIEF IN SOCIETY'S FUTURE

In part, this belief may be influenced by attitudes concerning the inevitability of the regime, the situation they find themselves in, and the values they want to see institutionalized for themselves and their children.

Clearly self interest plays a larger role in reactions to the regime than in beliefs about society. The latter are frequently confined to the more sophisticated and perhaps the better educated audience, only because the dimensions of consideration are more abstract and a future is contemplated beyond audience lifespan.

#### AUDIENCE BELIEF IN REGIME

Obviously the stability of the institution and the individuals represented by the regime can affect audience behavior because the regime is another element of anticipated outcome. PSYOP should always assume, as sometimes it does not, that any regime exists only with the permission of the people it rules. What people are willing and would be forced to surrender and sacrifice in an effort to defy or overthrow their regime is the main consideration, but in the long-run the choice is theirs. The definition of regime is also critical in this analysis: military leadership in combat is different, for example, than a continuing government. Loyalty is a factor that may influence action stemming from belief even in the absence of strong belief.

## OUTPUT OBJECTIVES: ACTIVATED BEHAVIORAL EFFECTIVENESS

By activated, we mean behavior that responds to a PSYOP operation. Activated behavior differs from attitudinal and awareness for two basic reasons:

1. Only until people behave (act) in accordance with PSYOP objectives can these objectives be wholly or partially realized. Moreover, actions not consistent with source objectives must be identified and evaluated because their consequences subtract from the gains that might otherwise be made.
2. Attitudes are not easy to measure either directly or by inference. Because we are unable to read people's minds, we must ask them what they think or we must search out a behavioral residue from which we can infer one's attitudes. Although it is true that people may clothe their behavior in ways that might disguise either their true attitudes or the consequences of what they have done, whether people have behaved in concert with source PSYOP objectives can be measured and the outcome of their behavior evaluated in terms of predetermined goals.

## AUDIENCE ACTIONS IN SELF INTEREST

PSYOP operations can provoke audience response in its own self interest, without regard for regime or source. Such behavior is predictable, can be deliberately provoked, and can be turned to the benefit of source effort despite the absence of audience conscious efforts to comply with PSYOP objectives. Because it can be identified and accounted for as part of the behavior that PSYOP seeks to cause, it is an activated behavior rather than an outcome objective.

The potential value to source in audience reactions to source message without regard to source or regime could be indicated in one or more of the following ways:

1. People feel no conscious guilt in action detrimental to the regime.
2. People do not ask themselves in advance whether their actions are or are not in compliance with regime ideology or orders.

3. People under interrogation by the regime will not voluntarily confess out of guilt feelings to being motivated by source.
4. People are more likely to be apathetic in times of crisis, generally of more help to source than their being antagonistic or active against source.
5. People will be more susceptible to source PSYOP message urging attitudes in behalf of self interest.

Indicators exist for this category of objectives just as much as they do for the other categories of Activated Behavioral Objectives.

#### AUDIENCE ACTIONS FACILITATING AND RESISTING REGIME

The regime is a focal consideration in any audience behavior PSYOP seeks to influence. This is particularly true of the circumstances in which the audience finds itself vis-a-vis source. Source and regime are opposing each other in an existing or potential adversary military situation in which the regime is very likely exerting authoritarian or totalitarian control over the audience.

There are occasions when PSYOP efforts will be devoted to activating behavior that facilitates regime efforts, though these are probably in the minority. But examples of such occasions will include efforts of a regime to surrender its population while the remainder of the military (or its allies) fight on, the granting of concessions to the audience accompanied by the kind of acceptance that will encourage more such concessions, or the ascendancy of a new regime sympathetic to source objectives.

In the majority of instances, however, audience behavior resisting the regime is sought in preference to actions facilitating the regime. Such resisting actions will include a wide spectrum of potential behavior such as failure to attend public meetings, malingering and low productivity at work, consuming goods that should be hoarded or used sparingly, devotion of time to other than regime required activities, sabotage, defection and surrender.

#### AUDIENCE ACTIONS FACILITATING AND RESISTING SOURCE

All audience actions that either facilitate or resist the regime of course affect our PSYOP objectives. Yet probably the most crucial category of objectives involves audience behavior that directly facilitates or resists the source and is more oriented to source PSYOP activity.

Examples of actions facilitating source include efforts to facilitate dissemination of source message, compliance with specific instructions communicated by source such as staying indoors, fleeing an area, writing letters expressing reactions, or defecting at a certain time and place in order to help their country later on. Obviously none of these actions will facilitate the regime; yet they may be motivated less in direct opposition to the regime than they are in response to source PSYOP.

But actions facilitating source can be evaluated only in the context of any actions that may occur in resistance to source. These include efforts to hinder dissemination of source message, actively urging anti-source attitudes, and reporting expressions of attitudes or behavior considered pro-source to the regime.

## OUTPUT OBJECTIVES: OUTCOMES

Audiences may think and act in accordance with PSYOP attitudinal and activated behavioral objectives. The final question is whether or not the consequences of their thoughts and behavior generate results that make effective contribution to source's military and political goals.

One must differentiate between the outcome of a total military operation and a PSYOP operational outcome. The total military outcome may succeed or flounder for reasons having nothing whatsoever to do with a PSYOP operation; accordingly the PSYOP operation should neither be credited or faulted for its accomplishment. But those elements of the total military operation that originate with PSYOP and influence the course of events of that military operation should be guided by effectiveness objectives and should therefore be subject to effectiveness measures. It is these end consequence effectiveness objectives that we call outcomes.

A vital objective is to confine the outcomes of PSYOP operations to relevant objectives. Other forces set in motion may produce negative feedback or compromise the efficacy of other non-PSYOP military efforts. On the other hand, unanticipated outcomes can also enhance the effectiveness of the PSYOP and/or other military operation.

Outcomes that can be activated directly or indirectly as a result of PSYOP are also important to control because they may furnish the stuff of indicators. But care must be taken that such indicators are clearly identified as reflecting non-PSYOP military consequences even though they result from PSYOP efforts. Examples could include:

1. Protests and threats of deprivation by the target country regime to source ally because of effect felt from source PSYOP.
2. Enemy fire directed at troop locations in the vicinity of loudspeaker tanks.
3. A concentration of enemy radio jammers that represents the harnessing of resources and concentration of broadcast engineering technology that might never have occurred.

4. A yardstick regulation effect; an offering by regime radio of some program content similar to source radio so that the former can win more listening time for its own radio system.
5. A harsh crackdown on a civilian population as a result of the regime's perception of civilian reactions to a PSYOP message.
6. A tendency for a regime spokesman to promise more than intended as a result of making concession in response to PSYOP concession demands.
7. Audience disgust with source because of carelessness and mistakes of source personnel job while carrying out a raid.

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## GLOSSARY

ARVN	Army of Vietnam.
Chieu Hoi	(Vietnam) A program of the GVN which offered amnesty to those Viet Cong who would desert the VC and turn themselves in to the GVN.
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support - part of MACV structure.
FMA	A subsystem of PAMIS (Foreign Media Analysis).
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces (Vietnam).
GVN	Government of Vietnam.
Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)	A system providing for monthly reports by U. S. district advisors on status of pacification in Vietnam.
Hoi Chanh	Official Vietnamese term for ralliers.
IRs	Interrogation Reports.
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Junkers	(German) Privileged classes of Prussian origin.
JUSPAO	Joint United States Public Affairs Office (Vietnam).
Kit Carson Scouts	VC deserters (Hoi Chanh) who volunteered to serve with American units as scouts. They were given the title "Kit Carson Scouts."
MACV	(U.S.) Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
NLF	National Liberation Front.
NVN	North Vietnam.
NVA	North Vietnamese Army.
ODCSOPS	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (Department of the Army) (also DCSOPS, DA).

## GLOSSARY (Cont'd)

PAMIS	PSYOP Automated Management Information System.
PEAS	A subsystem of PAMIS (PSYOP Effects Analysis System).
PFADS	A subsystem of PAMIS (PSYOP Foreign Area Data System).
POW	Prisoner of War.
Project POWOW	A series of studies on psychological warfare performed by Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, for the U. S. Army in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
PSYOPSIS	An automated reporting system for PSYOP used in Vietnam. The system was maintained by MACV.
PWI	Psychological Warfare Intelligence (World War II term).
Rallier	VC who defected to the GVN under the Chieu Hoi Program.
RFE	Radio Free Europe.
RL	Radio Liberty.
RVN	Republic of Vietnam.
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam, Armed Forces.
Samizdat	(Russian) Literally "self-publication."
Tachistoscope	An apparatus for the brief exposure of visual stimuli.
USIA	United States Information Agency.
VC	Viet Cong.
VOA	Voice of America.